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Abstract
This paper presents and tests a new model that highlights the role of reputation in
determining firms’ workforce composition strategy. Facing demand uncertainty, firms
in labor-intensive service industries, such as health care, often rely on temporary work-
ers. Past research has shown that firms employ more temporary workers when facing
greater demand fluctuations. However, this strategy is challenged by accumulating ev-
idence that permanent and temporary workers are not perfectly interchangeable in the
production of quality. This paper examines the strategies of firms facing this trade-
o↵: temporary workers provide flexibility in responding to demand fluctuations but
can lower reputation through a decline in quality. Through a model where demand is
stochastic and linked to firms’ reputation for quality, this paper predicts that firms’
workforce composition depends on their reputation. Using novel and rich data from
a large multi-state US home health provider, I provide evidence consistent with the
theory. First, patients visited more by permanent nurses were less likely to be rehospi-
talized. I use patients’ di↵erential distances to the nearest permanent and temporary
nurses as a source of exogenous variation in the proportion of permanent nurse visits.
Second, measuring firms’ reputation by the establishment of a strong referral base, I
find that low-reputation firms, such as new firms, decreased the share of temporary
nurses with demand fluctuations. These results imply that low-reputation firms forgo
short-term profitability in favor of long-term reputation gains through improvements
to service quality.
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for their invaluable advice and support throughout the research process. I would like to thank David Baiada,
Alan Wright, Ann Gallagher, and Stephanie Finnel for tremendous insight and data support throughout the
project. The Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics provided financial support.
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental challenges for health care delivery organizations facing demand
uncertainty is how to configure their workforce to improve care quality and performance.
Particularly, firms employ a combination of temporary and permanent workers to manage
fluctuations in demand. Temporary workers have become an important part of the health
care workforce: the percentage of temporary workers in health care increased from 5.3%
to 9.2% between 1995 and 2015 (Katz and Krueger, 2016).1 Existing economic literature
has shown that firms rely more on temporary workers when facing greater demand volatil-
ity due either to the opportunity cost of keeping an idle workforce (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994; Foote and Folta, 2002; Lotti and Viviano, 2012) or to the cost associated with high
turnover rate (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1991; Levin, 2002). However, this strategy is challenged
when permanent and temporary workers are not perfectly interchangeable in production.
In particular, the medical and nursing literature has suggested that permanent providers
outperform temporary ones (Bae et al., 2010; Pham et al., 2011; Lu and Lu, 2016). Thus, a
full understanding of how firms configure their workforce depends crucially on the trade-o↵
in using temporary workers: they provide greater flexibility in responding to fluctuation
in demand but may impede the establishment of reputation through lower quality of care.
Despite the salience of this trade-o↵—particularly to younger firms, which face both greater
demand fluctuations and a greater need to demonstrate high quality to their clientele—its
incorporation is largely absent from the existing literature. This may be due to a paucity
of longitudinal data containing firms’ labor configurations and quality outcomes. In this
paper, using novel data from the home health industry, I aim to fill this gap and paint a
more complete picture of temporary labor strategy in health care delivery.
I present and test a simple model of firms’ workforce composition choices, highlighting
the role of reputation in determining how firms optimally balance the trade-o↵ between re-
sponding to demand shocks and improving quality. Vast literature has shown the crucial
1Temporary workers refer to those engaged in alternative work arrangements, which Katz and Krueger
(2016) define as temporary help agency, on-call, contract workers and independent contractors or freelancers.
Employment in health care includes workers hired in the following two Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
categories: “healthcare practitioners and technical” (e.g. physicians and nurses) and “healthcare support”
(e.g. aides).
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role of reputation in determining quality (Klein and Le✏er, 1981; Carmichael, 1984; McMil-
lan and Woodru↵, 1999; Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Baker et al., 2002; Macchiavello and
Morjaria, 2015) and demand (Navathe and David, 2009; Johnson, 2011) in the presence of
non-enforceable contracts. In health care markets, demand is often non-contractible either
due to the organizational structure or a regulatory ban. Moreover, competition on quality
is important with generous health insurance while the competitive reallocation forces are at
work (Johnson, 2011; Chandra et al., 2016). Thus, the perception of a firm’s quality, which
forms a basis of the firm’s reputation, becomes an important determinant of demand faced
by the firm. Facing the trade-o↵ in using temporary workers, firms’ the firm’s workforce
composition choice would then crucially depend on the level of the firms’ reputation.
To build intuition for the role of reputation in determining firms’ workforce composition
choices, consider the start-ups Munchery and Instacart, which provide on-demand grocery
delivery service. These start-ups initially used independently contracted drivers to perform
all the tasks. However, due to high turnover and quality deterioration, the firms completely
eliminated or diminished the role of temporary workers particularly in tasks that are likely
to determine the quality of service.2 These cases suggest that the importance of reputation
building among starting firms makes them prioritize providing higher quality over purely
optimizing cost and rely less on temporary workers.
Making this intuition more rigorous, my model posits that a firm’s workforce composition
influences the market’s perception of the firm’s quality, and the firm’s demand is in turn
stochastically linked to its reputation for quality. Underlying this mechanism is a process of
dynamic reputation formation in which the market observes the firm’s quality signals and
updates the firm’s reputation. This model is built on Navathe and David (2009)’s model of
physicians’ technology adoption behavior under reputation concerns but I extend the model
to a stochastic optimal control problem to incorporate demand uncertainty. I explicitly
model the trade-o↵ involved in the workforce composition choice. On the one hand, the
proportion of demand served by permanent workers increases quality signals, which is a
key assumption that I verify in the empirical analyses, and thus increases reputation. On
2“A middle ground between contract worker and employee.” by Noam Scheiber, New York Times, De-
cember 10, 2015.
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the other hand, permanent workers reduce the firm’s expected short-term profitability since
the firm hires them before observing the demand realization. Therefore, the firm optimally
balances across time the long-term reputation gain from increasing the share of permanent
workers with the reduction in short-term profitability. The central predictions of the model
are that firms with lower reputation decrease the share of temporary workers in response
to demand volatility to achieve long-term gain in reputation. In contrast, firms with higher
reputation increase the share of temporary workers to reduce short-term profit loss.
I test the predictions of the model using novel and rich data from a large US home health
provider operating 106 autonomous o ces in 18 states during 2012-2015. The data contain
the entire home health visit records in each o ce showing all the interactions between a pa-
tient and individual providers who served her, as well as human resources characteristics such
as providers’ employment arrangements and weekly pays. Moreover, for each patient, the
data contain initial health status assessments, demographic characteristics, hospital read-
mission outcomes as well as referral sources. Combining these data, I construct weekly
longitudinal data for each o ce containing labor configuration, demand environments, as
well as measures of reputation. The unique level of detail in the data o↵er several advan-
tages. The patient-provider linked data during the entire span of each patient’s care allow
me to measure the workforce composition directly experienced by the patient and examine
the impact of workforce composition on hospital readmissions, a critical measure of perfor-
mance in the home health care industry. Furthermore, the patient-level referral source data
allow me to measure at a high frequency the level of establishment of referral relationships
each o ce has as a proxy for the o ce’s reputation.
I conduct my empirical analyses in two steps. First, I examine the impact of workforce
composition on hospital readmissions to verify the key model assumption that permanent
workers improve quality of care. To provide causal evidence, I use an exogenous variation in
the patients’ di↵erential distance to the nearest permanent and temporary nurses to predict
each patient’s proportion of permanent nurse visits. The instrument set exploits the insti-
tutional knowledge that home health agencies try to match patients with nearest providers
to minimize providers’ travel time and costs. I find that patients visited by a one standard
deviation higher proportion (39%) of permanent nurses were 50% less likely to be rehos-
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pitalized. This e↵ect holds after controlling for patients’ underlying health characteristics,
o ce-level demand and supply characteristics, patients’ ZIP code fixed e↵ects, firm fixed
e↵ects, and fixed e↵ects related to the timing of the end of care. This evidence validates
my model assumption and validates my claim that firms are faced with a trade-o↵ in using
temporary workers between flexibility and quality.
Second, I examine the impact of reputation on firms’ workforce composition and find evi-
dence consistent with both predictions of my model. I find that firms with weaker reputation
decreased the share of temporary nurses with demand fluctuations. This e↵ect is present
even if demand volatility was endogenously greater when firms’ reputation was lower. Firms
in the lowest quantile of reputation had a 7% lower percentage of temporary nurses when
demand volatility increased by one standard deviation. Considering firms’ age as a proxy of
reputation, I find a three times greater e↵ect for youngest firms aged 0-12 months, providing
further support to my model. These results suggest that low-reputation firms forgo short-
term profitability to achieve long-term reputation through quality improvement. In contrast,
I find that firms with higher reputation responded to demand volatility by increasing the
share of temporary nurses. As firms’ reputation rose to the top quantile, they had a 7.1%
higher percentage of temporary nurses for the same increase in demand volatility.
This paper contributes empirical evidence that firms’ workforce composition strategies
crucially depend on their reputation and provides a theoretical model to explain this. Al-
though traditional theory suggests that firms should increase the share of temporary labor in
the face of increased demand volatility, in my data I find that less established firms such as
starting firms instead decrease the share of temporary workers. This phenomenon cannot be
explained if only demand shocks are considered as a determinant of workforce composition. I
propose that this may be explained by taking into consideration a firm’s concern for building
reputation. This proposal is supported by my findings that higher use of permanent labor
can indeed improve quality of care.
This paper is related to and builds upon several topics in the literature. Most closely
related is work studying the relationship between demand uncertainty and labor input choices
(Rebitzer and Taylor, 1991; Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Levin, 2002; Lotti and Viviano, 2012)
and more broadly work on input choice under uncertainty (Oi, 1961; Nadiri and Rosen, 1973;
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Sandmo, 1971; Batra and Ullah, 1974; Hartman, 1976; Friedman and Pauly, 1981; Guiso
and Parigi, 1999; Baker et al., 2004). The paper is also related to literature on the role of
reputation in determining firms’ quality or commitment to non-enforceable contracts (Klein
and Le✏er, 1981; McMillan and Woodru↵, 1999; Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Navathe and
David, 2009; Johnson, 2011; Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2015). Finally, the paper is related
to the literature on the relationship between sta ng and quality (Cook et al., 2012; David
and Kim, 2016; Hockenberry and Becker, 2016; Lu and Lu, 2016).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide background
on home health care and the employment arrangements used by home health firms in the
data. In Section 3, I present a model of firms’ workforce composition choices. In Section 4,
I describe the data and sample restriction rules. In Section 5, I examine the impact of
workforce composition on hospital readmissions to verify the key model assumption that
permanent workers improve quality of care. In Section 6, I examine the e↵ect of reputation
on firms’ workforce composition. In Section 7, I conclude the paper.
2 Background on home health care industry and workforce
Home health care, which is provided to homebound patients who need skilled nursing
or therapy services, is an important and rapidly growing segment of the post-acute care
delivery system. I provide a more detailed background on the home health care industry
in Appendix A. Home health is an ideal setting to investigate the impact of reputation on
firms’ workforce composition choices. It is labor intensive, less technology-dependent, and
decentralized (David and Polsky, 2014), as patients receive services in their homes, making
it easier to attribute patient outcomes to workforce configuration. Moreover, quality is a
critical dimension on which firms compete since public insurance, i.e. Medicare, is a primary
payer with prospective payment and thus prices are administered (Gaynor et al., 2014).
Furthermore, referrals from other health care facilities are a primary source of new demand
for home health care firms. However, the regulation bans formally contracting with referral
sources for the number of referrals, thus making reputation an important determinant of the
firm’s demand volume. Consequently, demand is inherently uncertain and fluctuates a lot.
This also makes temporary labor an important source of labor supply in the home health
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industry.
There are six home health service disciplines in which home health firms demand la-
bor: skilled nursing (SN), home health aide (HH), physical therapy (PT), speech-language
pathology (ST), occupational therapy (OT), and medical social services (MSW).3 I provide
a detailed description of the distribution of di↵erent disciplines of workers In Appendix B.
But in this paper, I focus on the skilled nursing workforce—combination of registered nurses
(RNs) and licensed practice nurses (LPNs)—since nurses provide the most medically relevant
service that could potentially determine hospital readmissions and accounts for a majority of
the home health visits. Thus, home health firms have the largest demand for skilled nurses
and maintain the largest capacity of them each week.
In Table 1, I describe employment arrangements of skilled nurses in my data and provide
summary statistics for the number of nurses in each arrangement across all firms and weeks.
Nurses are hired under largely two compensation schemes: salary with guaranteed work and
expected productivity for each week and piece-rate pays without guaranteed work for each
day.4 Under salary, nurses can be hired either on a full-time, part-time with benefits, or
part-time without benefits basis. Under piece-rate pay, nurses can be hired either on an
on-call basis directly by the firms or hired as contractors through temporary help agencies.
In this paper, I focus on comparing salaried and piece-rate paid workers, and particularly
full-time and on-call workers since these two types of workers account for more than 70% of
a weekly workforce.
3 Theory
Consider a risk-neutral home health firm and many risk-neutral referral sources (e.g.,
hospitals) which can refer patients to the firm and determine the quantity of home health
demand Qt faced by the firm in periods t “ 0, 1, . . . . The sequence of events is as follows.
At the beginning of a period t, the firm’s reputation for quality among referral sources is
Rt.5 The demand the firm faces is influenced by its reputation, but remains stochastic
3Medicare covers only these six discipilnes.
4While salaried and piece-rate paid workers form a main part of the workforce on a weekly basis, firms
also supplement it with “o ce or other” workers whose primary duty is supervisory or administrative work
or is in a di↵erent business division.
5I assume the reputation in the initial period 0 to be some fixed value below the market average.
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overall. The firm must choose how many salaried workers to hire in advance of observing
the actual demand in period t. The market then views the fraction of demand served by
salaried workers as a quality signal and updates its judgment of the firm’s reputation for the
next period accordingly.
In a little more detail, let st and pt denote labor demand for salaried (i.e. permanent) and
piece-rate (i.e. temporary) workers, respectively. Assume that the units of labor demand
are equal to the units of home health demand for simplicity. The firm hires salaried workers
st before observing demand Qt. However, the firm can hire piece-rate labor after observ-
ing demand. Naturally, this is only done if demand exceeds salaried labor, i.e. Qt ° st.
Therefore,
Qt • minpst, Qtq ` pt. (1)
The firm’s proportion of salaried labor st{Qt impacts the firm’s reputation in the next period
t` 1.
Denote the price per unit of demand by ↵. The price is constant since the primary payer
of home health services is Medicare FFS, which has a prospective payment system. Assume
that this marginal revenue ↵ exceeds the marginal cost of serving demand, i.e. marginal cost
of labor for either type of workers. Then it is always profitable to serve all the demand that
arrives at the firm. Thus, the firm does not turn away any patients, and the constraint (1)
always holds with equality. Rearranging terms, this means the temporary labor demand pt
is given by
pt “ Qt ´minpst, Qtq (2)
“
$’&’%0 if st • QtQt ´ st otherwise (3)
To model how the firm’s reputation for quality is formed over time, suppose that its
reputation stock dynamically evolves as a combination of the history of reputation stocks
and new quality signals. Thus, I can write the next period’s reputation stock Rt`1 as a
function of the current period’s reputation stock Rt and the current period’s quality signal
8
't.
Rt`1 “ fpRt,'tq (4)
where f 1 is positive with respect to each argument. In this paper, I focus on hospital read-
mission rate as the main quality signal. Hospitals view readmissions as a critical measure of
the home health firm’s quality since the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP)
instituted under the A↵ordable Care Act (ACA) imposes financial penalties on hospitals
with high readmission rates starting from fiscal year 2012. As post-acute care entities can
play a significant role in preventing avoidable readmissions, hospitals prefer to contract with
freestanding home health agencies that achieve lower hospital readmissions (Worth, 2014).
Workforce composition is a crucial determinant of quality signals in health care, as shown
by previous literature which examines the impact of temporary nurses on patient outcomes
(Bae et al., 2010; Hockenberry and Becker, 2016; Lu and Lu, 2016). Specifically, in the
home health industry, workforce composition has a great potential to determine hospital
readmission rates, as David and Kim (2016) found that provider “hando↵s” from temporary
to permanent nurses are linked with higher probability of hospital readmissions.
Therefore, I make a key assumption that a higher proportion of salaried workers can
improve high-quality signals, which I verify in the empirical analyses in Section 5. Higher
quality workers are more likely to command a permanent position, typically have more expe-
rience, longer engagement with the firm and superior knowledge of its culture and standards.
On the other hand, permanent workers may have lower incentive to exert high e↵ort if they
expect longer tenure in the firm (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1991) or have shorter interaction with
each patient due to higher workloads. In econometric analysis in Section 5.4, I find evidence
that increasing the share of visits by permanent nurses reduces hospital readmissions using
an IV method.
I model the link between the firm’s demand quantity and reputation. Suppose that the
quantity of demand Qt is stochastically determined by reputation stock Rt:
Qt “ gpRtq (5)
where g1p¨q ° 0 implying that firms with greater reputation for quality receive higher demand.
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This is a reasonable assumption since, with administered prices, firms compete on non-price
dimensions. It is standard to assume that the firm’s market share increases with quality
(Gaynor et al., 2014).
The firm’s objective is to maximize expected present discounted value of the profit subject
to the constraint (2):
VtpRtq “ maxtstu8t“0, tptu8t“0 E
ÿ
t
 tp↵QtpRtq ´ cspstq ´ cppptqq (6)
subject to pt “ QtpRtq ´minpst, QtpRtqq. (7)
After plugging in the constraint (2) and rearranging terms, I obtain the following Bellman
equation:
VtpRtq “ max
st
E⇡pst, Rtq `  EV pRt`1q (8)
where
⇡pst, Rtq ” ↵QtpRtq ´ cspstq ´ cppQtpRtq ´minpst, QtpRtqqq.
In a general form, the expected profit for period t is given by
E⇡pst, Rtq “ ↵QtpRtq ´ cspstq `
ª
QtpRtq°st
cppQtpRtq ´ stqdµpQtq (9)
where dµpQtq is a probability measure of Qt. To derive an analytic solution, assume that Qt
is a stochastic function of Rt given by
QtpRtq “
$’&’%Q¯t ” µRt `  
?
Rt with probability 1{2
¯
Qt ” µRt ´  ?Rt with probability 1{2.
(10)
Thus, Qt is an iid random variable with mean µRt and standard deviation  
?
Rt. This
functional form is chosen so that Qt has the property of the law of large numbers, i.e. as Rt
increases, the relative demand volatility—standard deviation divided by mean (known as a
coe cient of variation)—declines by the factor of
?
Rt.
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Then the expected profit (9) can be rewritten as
E⇡t “ ↵µRt ´ cspstq ´ 1
2
cppµRt `  
a
Rt ´ stq. (11)
3.1 Baseline case of no reputation concern
To consider the firm’s choice of salaried labor st in the baseline case of no reputation
building, suppose that there is no reputation and the firm wants to find st that maximizes
expected profit (11). With discrete stochastic demand, I have to consider each possible
region for optimal st˚ relative to possible values of Qt. To simplify the analysis, I assume
that marginal cost of piece-rate labor is higher than marginal cost of salaried labor. This
immediately restricts st˚ to lie between the two possible values of Qt for two reasons. First,
there is no reason for the firm to hire more salaried labor than the maximum possible quantity
of demand. Second, if st˚ †
¯
Qt, the firm always has to hire piece-rate labor whose marginal
cost is greater by assumption. Moreover, this is a reasonable assumption since temporary
labor is less productive or lacks firm-specific skills due to shorter tenure, requiring more
training. The search cost for temporary labor is also likely higher. The first-order condition
is E⇡1tpst˚ q “ 0, i.e.
c1spstq “ 12c
1
ppµRt `  
a
Rt ´ stq. (12)
The condition (12) shows that the optimal st equates the marginal cost of salaried labor,
which is non-stochastic and thus known precisely, with the expected marginal cost of piece-
rate paid labor. If one hires more salaried labor, the expected marginal savings from not
having to hire more expensive piece-rate labor increases. However, at a su ciently high st,
the marginal cost of maintaining a salaried labor capacity becomes high enough to exceed
the expected marginal cost of piece-rate labor.
How does demand volatility   a↵ect firms’ relative use of piece-rate labor? Without
reputation concern, the firm would only want to minimize the sum of expected labor costs
for salaried and piece-rate labor. Since the firm hires piece-rate labor only when the demand
turns out high, one can expect that an increase in the volatility   may increase both salaried
as well as piece-rate labor. This is expected given that they serve all the demand. Therefore,
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one should examine how the relative demand for piece-rate labor changes. Indeed I find that
the firm increases the relative use of piece-rate labor as demand volatility increases unless
the rate of increase in the marginal cost for that labor is too high relatively. This result is
shown in Proposition 1. The proof is found in Appendix C.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there is no reputation consequence from firms’ labor config-
uration choice. Then when demand volatility increases, the firm’s share of piece-rate labor
increases under the assumption that piece-rate labor does not become “too expensive.”
3.2 Case of reputation concern
Now to understand the firms’ optimal labor configuration under reputation concerns, I
first model the firm’s reputation formation. I assume that quality signals 't are determined
by the proportion of permanent nurses as follows:
't ” '
ˆ
st
Qt
˙
“ st
AQt
,
where A is the market average of quality signals, which is the mean proportions of salaried
nurses in the market and thus lies between 0 and 1, inclusive. Furthermore, I assume the
formation of reputation in (4) follows the law of motion given by
Rt`1 “ R1´ t
ˆ
st
AQt
˙ 
, (13)
A reputation value of 1 corresponds to the market average A in terms of quality signals. I
assume the firm’s initial reputation is below average, that is R0 † 1. Furthermore, note that
Rt is bounded above by
1
A for all time. For Rt`1 is a weighted geometric average of Rt and
s{pAQq § 1{A. So if Rt § 1A , then also Rt`1 § 1A . Since we assumed R0 † 1, it follows by
induction that Rt § 1A for all t. This upper bound on reputation stock and consequently
also quantity of demand guarantees compactness of the state space and justifies the use of
stochastic Bellman theory.
(13) assumes that reputation in the next period is updated using a geometric mean of
the current period’s reputation and quality signals to allow for di↵erent weights placed on
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the history of reputation and quality signals. The smaller the weight   on quality signals,
the more “sticky” the firm’s reputation is: the overall history of reputation is weighted more
than just the quality signal from the last period.
Let   P p0, 1q be a discount factor. By solving the Bellman equation in (8), I obtain the
first-order condition given by
E
„B⇡t
Bst `  
BRt`1
Bst V
1pRt`1q
⇢
“ 0, (14)
and the envelope condition given by
V 1pRtq “ E
„ B⇡t
BRt `  
BRt`1
BRt V
1pRt`1q
⇢
. (15)
Combining the first-order condition and the envelope condition and advancing one period
forward, I obtain the Euler equation:
EB⇡tBst “  E
ˆBRt`1
Bst
˙„
E
ˆB⇡t`1
Bst`1
˙
EpBRt`2{BRt`1q
EpBRt`2{Bst`1q ´ E
B⇡t`1
BRt`1
⇢
(16)
The left-hand side of (16) represents the expected marginal profit from hiring one more
unit of salaried labor in period t:
EB⇡tBst “ ´c
1
spstq ` 12c
1
ppµRt `  
a
Rt ´ stq † 0. (17)
I assert that the sign of this expected marginal profit is negative for each t. It is not zero
when there is a reputation concern (i.e. right-hand side of (16) is nonzero). Moreover, if it
is positive, the firm always prefers to increase salaried labor because it increases both the
short-term profit and reputation, therefore facing no trade-o↵. Therefore, when there is a
reputation concern, increasing salaried labor reduces the firms’ short-term profit. Note that
this result can be compared with the case of having no reputation building where E⇡1tpst˚ q “ 0
is optimal.
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On the right-hand side of (16), the factor
E
ˆBRt`1
Bst
˙
“ 1
2
 
A
ˆ
ARt
st
˙1´ 
pQ¯tpRtq´  `
¯
QtpRtq´ q ° 0 (18)
is the reputation gain in the next period from increasing one unit of salaried labor in period
t. This scale is multiplied to the present discounted value of both future marginal profits
from increasing salaried labor (in the first term) and from increasing reputation (in the
second term) in the next period t ` 1 in the brackets. The first term in the brackets is a
product of two quantities: expected marginal profit per unit of increase in salaried labor in
the next period t` 1, and the marginal reputation gain two periods in the future t` 2 from
increasing t` 1’s reputation relative to the gain from new quality signals in t` 1. The ratio
measures a return on increasing salaried labor in t—how much the elevated base reputation
stock contributes to the future reputation in period t` 2 relative to new quality signals.
The second term in the brackets on the right-hand side of (16) represents the expected
marginal profit in the next period from increased reputation:
E B⇡t`1BRt`1 “ ↵µ´
1
2
c1ppµRt`1 `  
a
Rt`1 ´ st`1q
ˆ
µ`  
2
?
Rt`1
˙
(19)
Assume that parameters are set so that this expected derivative is positive, i.e. increasing
future reputation enhances future profit. Taken all together, (16) shows that the higher
expected marginal profit gains are from raising the reputation in the next period, the greater
the short-term profit loss the firm is willing to endure and the more salaried labor it is willing
to hire in the current period.
How do firms configure their workforce composition in response to demand volatility
when their reputations are at stake? As the firm’s reputation becomes high, the short-term
marginal profit loss from increasing salaried labor declines in (17). On the other hand, the
marginal profit gain from increased reputation when the firm hires one more unit of salaried
labor also seems to decline in (19). Therefore, for the firm with higher reputation, it may
be more profitable to decrease the relative use of salaried labor.
To pin down exactly the role of demand volatility   and reputation Rt in (16), I di↵eren-
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tiate (16) with respect to   and examine how it depends on Rt. Suppose that   increases by
one unit in period t but not in the future periods. According to the timing of the model, a
change in   in period t a↵ects Qt and thus st, which consequently a↵ects future reputation
Rt`1 and thus st`1; however, it does not a↵ect Rt. I find that the above intuition holds:
the firm’s relative use of salaried labor decreases with demand volatility if the reputation is
higher. This result is shown in Proposition 2. The proof is found in Appendix C. I find the
reason for this is that the rate of increase in marginal profit from increasing reputation falls
faster.
Proposition 2. Firms decrease the share of salaried labor when demand volatility increases
if their reputation is higher. Conversely, the firm’s share of salaried labor increases with
demand volatility if the reputation is lower.
3.3 Summary
The model makes the following testable predictions:
1. When firms’ reputation is lower, higher demand volatility decreases firms’ share of
piece-rate paid labor.
2. When firms’ reputation is higher, higher demand volatility increases firms’ share of
piece-rate paid labor.
4 Data
My primary data source is novel data from a large US for-profit freestanding home health
provider firm operating 106 autonomous o ces in 18 states, which contain firms’ labor
configuration and patients’ outcomes in each o ce at an unusual level of detail.6 Since each
o ce autonomously decides scheduling and sta ng and is run as a profit center, we can
regard each o ce as a separate “firm” in our empirical analysis.7 Thus, note that an o ce
6 These 18 states are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mary-
land, North Carolina, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vir-
gina, and Vermont.
7This large set of independently run o ces alleviates some concern about the generalizability of our
results to other HHAs even if they all belong to one company. During 2013, compared to a national sample
of freestanding agencies, home health o ces in our sample tend to be larger, have a lower share of visits
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is called a firm in this paper even if those o ces all belong to one company. The data cover
years 2012–2015.
My data contain the entire home health visit records in each o ce showing all the inter-
actions between a patient and individual providers who served her. I match these visit-level
data with the human resources (HR) data containing the history of employment arrange-
ments for each provider to measure the workforce composition both at the patient and
firm-week level. At the patient level, I can measure the workforce composition exposed
to the patient by computing the proportion of visits provided by full-time nurses during
her episode. At the firm-week level, I measure o ces’ workforce composition choices by
computing the share of active full-time or on-call nurses on each week.
Beyond the workforce composition, I can also obtain demand and labor supply character-
istics in each firm by constructing weekly or daily panel data for firms. When I investigate
the role of reputation and demand fluctuations on firms’ workforce composition, I mainly use
weekly panel data. For each firm-week cell, I measure the total number of active providers as
well as workload, measured by the number of visits, of providers in di↵erent arrangements.
Moreover, I identify whether a full-time provider was absent on weekdays using the visit-
level data. The HR data also provide employment start and termination dates and track
the reason for employment terminations if providers leave. Therefore, I measure turnover
rates at the o ce-week level, and particularly turnover rates using only the workers who
quit, which may have a di↵erent impact on firms’ labor configuration choices from overall
turnover rates. My data contain weekly pays for each provider. By combining with data
on providers’ weekly workload, I measure the wage, i.e. pay divided by workload, for each
provider in di↵erent work arrangements.
Moreover, my data contain patient episode-admission level data, where an episode is de-
fined as a 60-day period of receiving home health services, as described in Section ??.8 Thus,
for each o ce-week cell, I also observe the number of ongoing episodes as well as construct
provided for skilled nursing and instead have a higher share of visits provided for therapy, and have a
lower share of episodes provided to dual-eligible Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries, which seem to be more
common characteristics of proprietary agencies (Cabin et al., 2014; MedPAC, 2016b).
8This definition of a 60-day home health episode is based on the fact that the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) pays a prospective payment rate for each episode to home health agencies for
“traditional Medicare” (Part A) enrollees, not privately insured Medicare enrollees.
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the degree of demand volatility, which I describe in detail in Section 6.1. Furthermore, since
my data provide referral sources for each patient, I track how many referrals each referral
source, such as a hospital, makes in each o ce-week. These data allow me to measure firms’
reputation among referral sources at the weekly level.
I also construct each firm’s age (in years) using its start of business date in the firm-level
data. Moreover, I need a definition of the local market in which firms compete to measure
the competitiveness of local home health market as well as determine whether the firm had
a branch presence in the referral region, which allows me to gauge the impact of reputation.
Therefore, I identify each firm’s Hospital Referral Region (HRR), which represents a “regional
health care market for tertiary medical care that generally requires the services of a major
referral center” using the 2012 Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care crosswalk data for each
5-digit ZIP code.9
Finally, my data contain all the patients served by each o ce and for which o ces
were required to collect rich demographic and health risks data using the CMS’s Outcome
and Assessment Information Set (OASIS) surveys.10 The patient data contained a rich
set of underlying health risks assessed at the beginning of each home health admission and
hospital readmission outcomes.11 I focus on hospital readmissions as a key measure of quality
of care since both hospitals and freestanding HHAs view it as a key competitive di↵erentiator
among HHAs under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) established by
the A↵ordable Care Act (ACA) (Worth, 2014).
For additional data to construct the competitiveness of local home health markets, I use
the Medicare Cost Reports data for years 2011-2015. For each HRR-year, I sum the squared
share of episodes in each home health agency to compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(HHI).
In my final analyses, I restrict to 67 o ces in 13 states that have been around for at
most 8 years to keep the sample reasonably well balanced and avoid having too small sample
9The Dartmouth Atlas data were obtained from http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/
geography/ZipHsaHrr12.xls (Accessed on October 1, 2016).
10These patients include all the patients enrolled in both public and private versions of Medicare, Medicaid
and a small fraction of private insured patients for which their plans required the collection of OASIS data.
11The OASIS data actually contain two variables which I use to identify whether a patient had a hospital
readmission: whether patients had a hospitalization prior to home health care and hospitalization dates
during home health care.
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size per firm.12 I can observe 28 of them since the start of business. In the analyses of the
e↵ects of labor mix on hospital readmissions, I use a sample of home health episodes for
elderly patients of age 65 or over who are discharged from hospitals. The sample includes
episodes whose start of home health care is between January 1, 2012, the start of my sample
period, and July 31, 2015, the last available date for patient data. I exclude patients who
had multiple subsequent home health episodes as these home health stays may have di↵erent
patterns of visit schedules and sta ng mix. I exclude episodes for which I have missing data
on providers’ employment arrangements and I cannot identify whether they had a hospital
stay prior to home health care. Moreover, I exclude cognitively or mentally vegetative or
non-responsive patients. I also restrict to episodes that involved at least 2 number of skilled
nursing visits. The final sample includes 11,433 home health episodes.
In the analyses of the impact of reputation and demand fluctuations on the workforce
composition, I use a sample of firm-week level observations for weeks spanning from April
23, 2012 to November 9, 2015, the last week for which I have personnel data for the entire
week.13 A week is the time unit of my analyses because firms hire workers on a weekly basis.
I restrict to observations with non-missing values in all measures of reputation, demand
fluctuation workforce composition, and other firm characteristics. The final sample contains
7,370 observations. 5 of 67 firms opened in the markets with no other branches present.
5 Impact of workforce composition on quality of care
How important is labor mix in driving quality of care, a key measure of firm performance
in the health care industry? To motivate my study of labor mix, I first investigate the
importance of firms’ workforce composition strategies in determining the likelihood of hospi-
tal readmissions, which has become a critical competitive di↵erentiator among freestanding
home health agencies under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (Worth, 2014).
Evidence on the di↵erence in quality of care provided between salaried and piece-rate paid
workers would also help explain my results on the determinants of firms’ labor mix strategies.
12The number of firms that have been in business for more than 8 years substantially declines, and these
firms are smaller in size even compared to new firms on average. Thus, these firms do not serve as a good
control group when comparing with new firms.
13The first few weeks in 2012 are dropped out since I construct many variables using the rolling mean or
rolling standard deviation.
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Specifically, I empirically estimate whether patients served by a higher proportion of
salaried nurses have a di↵erent likelihood of hospital readmissions after controlling for a rich
set of underlying health status variables. I focus on the skilled nursing service because that
is the most prevalent form of home health care and that is the most relevant service to
determining the hospitalization outcome.
5.1 Di↵erences between permanent and temporary nurses: Descriptive statis-
tics
Before examining the e↵ect of labor mix on the probability of rehospitalization, I explore
characteristics of salaried and piece-rate paid nurses in Table 2 to motivate why the di↵erence
in quality of care may arise. Full-time nurses had substantially higher workloads, as measured
in terms of number of visits, therefore accumulating much more experience during their
employment. On days nurses work, the number of visits provided by full-time nurses was
greater by a factor of 2-2.5 either daily or weekly. This translates to three times higher
weekly pay (i.e. salary) for full-time nurses than for piece-rate paid on-call nurses, which is
disproportionately higher than what the productivity di↵erence would imply. While tenure
was longer for full-time nurses, as expected, the di↵erence from tenure of on-call nurses was
not as salient. On the other hand, full-time nurses had a slightly shorter mean length of
visits and got paid a lower per-visit rate, potentially deteriorating quality of care. Therefore,
this set of descriptive facts suggest that a higher proportion of full-time nurse visits may
lead to higher quality of care due to their longer experience and higher pay but also may
lead to lower quality of care due to shorter lengths of visits.
5.2 Empirical specifications
To determine the e↵ect of labor mix on quality of care, I need to isolate a measure of
patients’ exposure to labor mix that is uncorrelated with unobserved patient characteristics.
To measure a labor mix variation at the patient level, I compute the fraction of visits provided
by full-time skilled nurses. My estimating model takes the form
Readmitikzt “  1LMik `  2Vik `  3Hik `X1ik 1 `W1ik 2 `D1t ` ↵k ` ⌘z ` ✏ikzt (20)
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where Readmitikzt is an indicator variable for rehospitalization of a patient i living in ZIP
code z served by firm k in period t. The readmission probability is a function of a vector of
the composition of nurses serving the patient LMis; the total number of nurse visits during
the patient’s episode Vik; the number of nurse hando↵sHik (i.e. frequency of nursing provider
switches); a vector of patients’ observable characteristicsXik; a vector of o ce characteristics
Wik; a vector of time level variables Dt; firm fixed e↵ects ↵k and patients’ ZIP code fixed
e↵ects ⌘z; and an unobserved idiosyncratic disturbance ✏ikzt. The key coe cient I want to
estimate is  1.
The identification assumption is that the marginal e↵ect of the proportion of visits by
full-time nurses on the likelihood of rehospitalization does not vary in unobserved dimen-
sions after controlling for observed variables. However, there is a potential concern that
the composition of visits between salaried and temporary nurses may be endogenous, i.e.
patients who receive a higher proportion of full-time nurse visits may be di↵erent in as-
pects unobserved to the econometrician. On the one hand, to the extent that patients with
greater unobserved severity get more visits and are more likely to see piece-rate nurses in
addition to salaried nurses, the OLS estimate of  1 could be biased downward. Then the
e↵ect of increasing the proportion of full-time nurse visits on preventing rehospitalization
would be overstated. I address this issue, however, by controlling for the number of nurse
visits and hando↵s during the patient’s episode. On the other hand, the OLS estimate of  1
could be biased upward to the extent that sicker patients are assigned to full-time nurses,
who are more experienced as shown in Table 3. Then this bias would work against finding
any negative e↵ect of an increase in the proportion of full-time nurse visits on the hospital
readmissions.
Moreover, the total number of nurse visits and hando↵s are independently likely to be
endogenous since patients who get dynamically sicker during the episode would get more
intensive treatment, i.e. higher number of nurse visits, and receive more continuous care, i.e.
fewer number of hando↵s. David and Kim (2016) have acknowledged the potential e↵ects
of unobserved dynamic severity on the likelihood of having a nurse visit and hando↵s, and
show that once controlling for whether a patient gets a visit, experiencing nurse hando↵s
increases the likelihood of rehospitalization by 42% (David and Kim, 2016). To isolate the
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e↵ect of labor mix on hospital readmissions from these separate channels, I control for the
number of nurse visits and hando↵s and instrument them using the same set of instruments
as for the proportion of nurse visits.
To address the endogeneity concern, I instrument for the proportion of full-time nurse
visits and total number of visits and hando↵s using four sets of instruments representing
patients’ geographic distance to the three nearest full-time and on-call nurses, the number of
those nearest nurses and their productivity. With these measures, the identification assump-
tion becomes that patients having a higher proportion of visits by full-time nurses, more
nurse visits, and more nurse hando↵s, as measured by the instrument set, do not have a
di↵erent distribution of severity.
The first instrument set includes how close by a full-time and on-call nurse lives to the
patient relative to the nurse’s usual serving distance. This instrument set is based on the
institutional knowledge that HHAs try to assign to a patient providers who live relatively
close by to her to minimize providers’ travel time and costs. From the agency’s point of
view, the shorter the travel distances and times are, the more cost e cient it is since workers
spend less time on the road for the same level of visit productivity and o ces save on
mileage payment. The geography-based assignment of service providers to patients has been
well noted in the home health care settings as well as in other mobile workforce settings,
such as police.14
To construct this set of instruments, for each patient who starts home health care in
month t in o ce k, I find two types of nurses, one full-time and one on-call, who are actively
working in that o ce during the month and who live nearest to the patient.1516 I compute
the straight-line distance (in miles) between the patient and each nurse’s 5-digit ZIP code.
I further compute each nurse’s usual serving distance (i.e. radius) in each o ce-month by
14The operations management literature has long addressed this “districting” problem of how to partition
a firm’s service market region into a contiguous set of districts and assign workers to each district to minimize
each worker’s travel distances and equalize the workload across workers (Tavares-Pereira et al., 2007).
15I assume that a worker being active during the first month of the patient is a good predictor of the
fraction of visits provided by piece-rate nurses since the majority of nurse visits are provided in the first half
of the episode.
16There are many cases in which there are no other types of workers, such as part-time or contract
workers, working in the same o ce during the patient’s episode. Thus, using the distance to these workers
substantially reduces the sample size and I do not use these variables as instruments.
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computing the weighted average of distances to his patients using the proportion of visits
he made in each ZIP code as weights. I subtract the nearest full-time (on-call) nurse’s
serving distance during the patient’s first month from the distance between the nurse and
the patient. I repeat this procedure for second and third nearest full-time and on-call nurses,
respectively. Thus, I get 6 variables in the first instrument set.
For the second set of instruments, I count the number of nearest, second nearest and
third nearest full-time and on-call nurses, respectively, during the patient’s episode. 80% of
patient episodes have only one full-time nurse living in the nearest ZIP code; however, the
remaining 20% of episodes had 2-3 full-time nurses in the nearest ZIP code, which increases
the likelihood of having visits by a full-time nurse. I construct 6 variables for the second
instrument set.
For the third set of instruments, I use the total workload of the nearest, second nearest and
third nearest full-time nurses and on-call nurses, respectively, during the patient’s episode. If
the patient’s proximately residing full-time nurses are too busy, the patient may be less likely
to get visits by the full-time nurses. However, if those nurses have higher workloads, it could
also imply that they are more productive, increasing the likelihood of getting visits by them.
As I show later, I find that the latter e↵ect dominates. To compute this set of instruments,
I compute the daily number of visits of the nearest full-time (on-call) nurse during each
patient’s episode and sum the daily workload across days of the patient’s episode. I exclude
the number of visits made for the patient, if any, since to avoid mechanical relationship
between higher workload of a nurse and a higher proportion of visits by the nurse. I repeat
this procedure for the second and third nearest full-time and on-call nurses, respectively.
Thus, I also get 6 variables in the third instrument set.
For the fourth set of instruments, I include the interaction terms of relative distance in
the first set and the mean workload in the third set for the nearest, second nearest, and third
nearest full-time and on-call nurses, respectively. As a result, I get 6 variables in the fourth
instrument set.
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5.3 Observed characteristics of patients and firms
In the estimating equation 20, I also control for a vector Xik of patient-level variables
representing patients’ demographics and initial health status as well as a vector Wik of
o ce-day level demand and labor supply variables averaged across days during the patient’s
episode.
First, in the vector Xik of patient level variables, I include three groups of variables.
First, a set of indicator variables for patient demographics is included: age dummies for each
age 66-94 and age 95 or higher (reference group is age 65), gender, race, insurance type,
an indicator for having no informal care assistance available, and an indicator for living
alone.17 Second, a set of indicator variables for comorbidity factors is included: indicators
for 17 Charlson comorbidity score factors, indicators for overall health status, indicators
for high-risk factors including alcohol dependency, drug dependency, smoking, obesity, and
indicators for conditions prior to hospital stay within past 14 days including disruptive or so-
cially inappropriate behavior, impaired decision making, indwelling or suprapublic catheter,
intractable pain, serious memory loss and/or urinary incontinence.18 Third, a set of indica-
tor variables associated with high risk of hospitalization is included: history of 2 or more
falls in the past 12 months, 2 or more hospitalizations in the past 6 months, a decline in
mental, emotional, or behavioral status in the past 3 months, currently taking 5 or more
medications, and others.
In the vector Wik of o ce level variables, I include the mean of o ce-day level variables
capturing the caseload and labor supply conditions in each o ce across the patient’s home
health days. The o ce-day level variables include the number of ongoing episodes, the
number of active skilled nurses, and the fraction of active piece-rate nurses working in an
o ce-day cell.
Finally, I control for o ce fixed e↵ects ↵k, patient’s ZIP code fixed e↵ects ⌘z, and end-
of-care time fixed e↵ects Dt. The o ce fixed e↵ects remove time-constant o ce-specific
17 Insurance types include Medicare Advantage (MA) plans with a visit-based reimbursement, MA plans
with an episode-based reimbursement, and dual eligible with Medicaid enrollment (reference group is Medi-
care FFS).
18Indicators for overall health status include indicators for very bad (patient has serious progressive condi-
tions that could lead to death within a year), bad (patient is likely to remain in fragile health) and temporarily
bad (temporary facing high health risks).
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or geographic di↵erences in hospital readmissions, for example, through di↵erent hospital
policies or state regulations concerning patient readmissions, such as states with Certificate-
of-Need (CON) laws imposing home health entry restriction (Polsky et al., 2014). The ZIP
code fixed e↵ects prevent getting spurious results due to the possibility that patients living
in particularly remote areas are much more likely to get rehospitalized instead of getting
home health intervention even in the same o ce. In the vector Dt of end-of-care time
fixed e↵ects, I include indicators for each day of week (6 dummies), week of the year (51
dummies depending on the year), and indicators for year (3 dummies). This vectors controls
for any time-constant e↵ects related to the timing of the patient’s episode which a↵ects
rehospitalization, such as holiday week or weekend.
In summary, my identification is based on patients who were served by the same o ce,
lived in the same ZIP code and ended home health care on the same week as well as the
same day of week but whose proximately residing full-time and on-call nurses had di↵erent
circumstances during the patient’s episode and thus whose probability of getting visits by a
full-time nurse was di↵erent. The nearby nurse could have had a smaller coverage distance or
been not so productive, or not active during the patient’s episode, decreasing the probability
of getting full-time nurse visits for the patient. I find that these results hold in Tables 4, 5,
and 6.
Before showing the IV regression results, I present Table 3 for the summary statistics for
the sample of patients used in my analysis of the e↵ects of labor mix on quality of care. I
use 11,433 patient episodes who had at least 2 skilled nurse visits during the episode.
5.4 Empirical results on the impact of workforce composition on hospital read-
mission
I obtain two-stage least square estimates of the equation 20 using a two-step e cient
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. I cluster standard errors at the o ce
level to allow for potential within-o ce error correlation. Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the first-
stage results for the proportion of full-time nurse visits, number of nurse visits, and number
of hando↵s, respectively; and Table 7 reports the second-stage results for the probability of
rehospitalization. In all tables, in column 1, I only control for the vector of o ce-level charac-
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teristics and fixed e↵ects. In columns (2)-(4), I incrementally control for the hospitalization
risk, demographic and comorbidity factors, respectively.
The first-stage results show that the entire set of instruments is jointly a strong predictor
of each of the endogenous variables. In column (4) for the most saturated specification
in Tables 4, 5 and 6, the F-statistics are 32, 268, and 22, respectively. In Table 4, when
patients live farther away from their second nearest full-time nurses relative to the nurses’
usual serving distance, the probability of getting a full-time nurse visit declines, as expected.
However, I do not find the same e↵ects for other distance variables. Similarly, patients
having more full-time nurses and having fewer on-call nurses living nearby have a statistically
significantly higher proportion of full-time nurse visits, as expected. When the workload
of nearest full-time nurses and on-call nurses increases, the proportion of full-time nurse
visits increase and decrease, respectively, with statistical significance. This suggests that
higher workloads of nearby nurses increase the probability of getting visits by those nurses,
regardless of the nurses’ work arrangement. This finding is also confirmed with statistically
significantly positive e↵ects of total workload of nearby nurses on the number of visits,
regardless of the employment arrangement, in Table 5. Interestingly, this table also shows
that patients living relatively farther away from second nearest on-call nurses tend to have
fewer nurse visits. Table 6 shows that patients living relatively farther away from the third
nearest full-time nurses and having higher-workload nurses, have statistically significantly
more nurse hando↵s. This matches the intuition and also indicates that higher workload of
nurses increases the patient’s probability of receiving full-time nurse visits and number of
nurse visits but also increases the number of nurse hando↵s.
Finally, Table 7 reports second-stage results. I find that hospital readmissions are strongly
influenced by the proportion of full-time nurse visits as well as number of nurse visits and
hando↵s. The p-values for the Sargan-Hansen J-statistic values are 0.46–0.50, suggesting
that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instrument set is exogenous. The second
and third rows show that one more nurse visit increases the probability of rehospitalization
by 32%. It is counterintuitive to find a negative marginal e↵ect of hando↵s given that David
and Kim (2016) show a large and statistically significantly positive e↵ect of experiencing a
hando↵ on rehospitalization after controlling for the home health day fixed e↵ect as well as
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proxies for dynamic changes in patients’ severity using patient episode-day level observations.
In my setting, controlling for both the proportion of visits by full-time nurses and the total
number of nurse visits means that the number of visits by full-time nurses is held constant.
Thus, increasing nurse hando↵s means increasing hando↵s within the same type of nurses—
either from a full-time nurse to another full-time nurse or from a non-full-time nurse to
another non-full-time nurse. In this case, one hypothesis for the negative e↵ect of hando↵s
is that hando↵s within the same type of nurses are intended to improve patient conditions
and consequently prevent readmissions. Lastly, I find that increasing the proportion of
full-time nurse visits has a strong potential to prevent hospital readmissions. One standard
deviation—39%—increase in the proportion of full-time nurse visits decreases the probability
of rehospitalization by 49%.
6 Impact of reputation and demand fluctuations on the workforce composition
In Section 5, I find a substantial e↵ect of increasing the proportion of full-time nurse visits
on reducing the likelihood of rehospitalization, which is a key measure of quality of care in
the home health care industry. Conversations with directors of branch firms in my data,
especially new ones that need to build their reputation among potential referral partners,
revealed that firms acknowledged the potential di↵erence in quality of care between full-
time and on-call nurses. They said that one of the reasons against using on-call workers is
a shortfall in quality of service due to a lack of training and temporary and intermittent
engagement. In this section, I formally investigate this anecdotal evidence and examine
whether firms’ reputation a↵ects firms’ labor mix strategies.
Since the firms in my data belong to one company, firms may get more brand recognition
in the markets with previously existing branches. Therefore, I use the sample of firms that
had no previously existing branches in the firm’s county, the unit of local market (i.e. “new in
town” firms).19 Out of 107, I use 50 firms that are “new in town” according to the definition
above. These “new in town” firms form the base of our baseline estimation sample.
19To avoid counting firms that opened only just before a firm opened as incumbent, I define incumbent
firms as having been around for at least 6 months at the time of a firm’s opening.
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6.1 Evolution of firm’s demand volatility, workforce composition, and reputa-
tion: Descriptive facts
I investigate whether firms’ labor mix strategy in response to demand volatility system-
atically changes by their reputation among referral sources. To understand the role of firm
reputation in determining firms’ labor mix strategy, I first investigate how the firms’ repu-
tation as well as demand environments change by firm age. Then I examine how the labor
mix evolves by firm age, and how the relationship between labor mix and demand volatility
changes by firm age.
I measure firms’ reputation in several ways that represent the establishment of a strong
patient referral network, as referrals are the primary way of generating new demand. Par-
ticularly, I focus on the size, dispersion, consistency, and strength of a referral network with
hospitals.20 For each firm i and week t, I create the following four measures of reputation
Repit. First, I measure the size of a referral network by counting the number of unique
hospital referral sources that have referred to the firm i over the past 4 weeks including
the current week, t ´ 3, ..., t. Second, I measure the dispersion of a referral network, which
equals minus 1 times the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of referrals among hospital re-
ferral sources over the previous 4 weeks. Thus, the higher and closer to zero the dispersion
measure is, the more dispersed referrals are. The more dispersed referral network represents
a stronger network since a firm does not depend on only a small set of hospitals to make
referrals when the timing of patient’s hospital discharge is idiosyncratic. Third, I measure
the consistency of a referral network by computing the proportion of weeks a given hospital
j has referred to the home health firm i repeatedly in the previous 4 weeks. I aggregate
this firm-week-hospital level measure to the firm-week level by taking a weighted average.
For the hospital weight !ijt, I use the share of total hospital referrals received by i over the
past 4 weeks that come from each hospital j, assigning higher weights to hospitals that have
referred relatively more to the firm recently. Fourth, I measure the firm’s importance as a
referral partner to the referral network by computing the share of total Medicare patients
being discharged from a hospital j to home health over the past 4 weeks that are referred to
20Hospitals are the largest referral source to home health agencies in my data; hospital referrals account
for 30% of new admissions a week on average.
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the home health firm i. This measures each firm i’s relative importance as a referral partner
to the hospital. Similar to the consistency measure above, I take a weighted average of this
firm-week-hospital level measure using the same weights !ijt.
Figure 2 plots each of the four reputation measures for each firm-week against the firm age
in years. The central line plots fitted values from a locally weighted regression (from the loess
method) of each of the reputation measures on the continuous firm age values, and the outer
lines plot point-wise confidence intervals. By all measures, firms develop a stronger referral
network of hospitals as they age.21 In Panel 2a, at the startup, firms received referrals from
3 di↵erent hospitals. However, over the 9 years since the startup, their network consistently
grows and it includes more than 10 di↵erent hospitals at age 8-9. As the network expands,
the dispersion of the referral network naturally grew, as shown in Panel 2b. In Panel 2c,
the referral consistency from the same hospital consistently grew as firms aged. The same
hospital increasingly referred back to a firm with the probability of 60% when the firm is 8-9
years old, compared to 30% at the startup. as firms aged. However, the referral consistency
did not rise further than 60% and leveled out after the age 3. In Panel 2d, the importance
as a referral partner to the network declined as firms aged. Hospitals decreased the share of
home health agency referrals to the firms in my data as firms aged by nearly 10 percentage
points when firms were 4 years old. This pattern is surprising as all the above three measures
showed that the firms’ reputation increased with firm age. However, the degree of decline is
small compared to other measures of reputation.
The reputation growth of firms over the lifecycle shown in Figure 2 shows that firm
age could be a source and proxy of reputation, as similarly viewed in Banerjee and Duflo
(2000). As firms’ reputation grew as they aged, how did their demand environments, and
consequently their labor mix, change? Figure 3 shows that firms grew bigger and faced lower
demand volatility as they aged. This is not surprising given that firms developed a stronger
referral network as they aged, as shown in Figure 2. I measure demand in Panel 3a by the
number of home health cases (i.e. 60-day episodes) served by the firm on a given week,
21The reputation growth of firms shown in Figure 2 is comparable to other similar firm growth patterns
noted in previous literature (Dunne et al., 1989; Haltiwanger et al., 1999; Oi and Idson, 1999; Brown and
Medo↵, 2003). The firm age has been found to be positively associated with firm productivity (Haltiwanger
et al., 1999) and the likelihood of survival (Dunne et al., 1989). There are mixed results on the relationship
between firm age and wage (Oi and Idson, 1999; Brown and Medo↵, 2003).
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which includes both new patients and patients whose care is extended for additional home
health care. To measure the degree of demand volatility in Panel 3b, I use a type of volatility
measure that is frequently used in the finance literature (Ferson, 2013). I first compute the
log ratio of the aforementioned demand for the current week to demand for the previous
week, which approximates the percentage change in demand volume week-to-week Then I
take a standard deviation of these weekly log ratios over the past 4 weeks.2223 Even within
each firm age year bin, there is a wider variation in demand volatility for younger firms
than for older firms, as shown in Panel 3c. This figure shows the boxplot of mean demand
volatility for each firm in each age year bin. Even if each data point is an aggregated mean
for each firm in each age bin, the interquartile range (IQR) is greatest at firm age 0-12
months, and substantially declines once the firm reaches age 3.
How did firms’ labor mix change as they aged? Figure 4 shows the weekly percentage of
nurses hired in each arrangement by firm age.24 For the sake of clarity, I grouped firm age
into 4 di↵erent bins: 0-12 months old, 12-24 months old, 24-48 months old, and 48 or more
months old (corresponding to firm age year 0, 1, 2-3, and 4 or more, respectively, in the
previous figures). Older firms concentrated more on full-time and on-call nurses instead of
using part-time, contract or o ce/other nurses. In particular, firms increased the percentage
of nurses in full-time position—the primary arrangement used for permanent employees—by
nearly twofold from nearly 19% to 39%, when they were 4 or more years old compared to
the startup. At the same time, they slightly decreased the percentage of on-call nurses—
the primary arrangement used for temporary employees—from 43% to 36%. The labor mix
is obviously endogenously determined by the demand size and volatility. Therefore, the
increase in full-time nurses and decrease in on-call nurses with firm age coincide with an
22When I use the window of 8 weeks, the values of demand fluctuations show little change.
23My measure of demand volatility is likely understated since I use an endogenous measure of demand—
the number of home health cases chosen by each firm—rather than an exogenous measure of demand such
as the actual number of home health cases that arrived at the firm, some of which could be rejected. The
volume of rejected cases might also vary across firm age.
24This proportion measure of labor inputs using stocks rather than service flows or rate of utilization is
preferred in this context since service flows for workers are fixed in advance (for example, salaried workers are
expected to provide the pre-specified number of visits on each week), or workers’ visit allocation across days
are shaped by patients’ needs and workers’ availability rather than firms’ decisions. Service flows may be
preferred for measuring labor inputs if, for example, when one wants to precisely measure firms’ productivity
conditional on operating (Braguinsky et al., 2015).
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increase in demand volume and a decrease in demand volatility shown in Figure 3.25
However, firms’ labor mix is more instantly determined by the time-varying demand
environments, especially since firms can instantly vary the number of temporary nurses they
hire. Therefore, the aggregate level of labor mix in Figure 4 fails to capture how firms’ labor
mix changes in response to demand volatility and whether the responses vary by firm age, a
proxy of firm reputation. Thus, in Figure 5, I examine how the slopes from the regression of
the percentage of full-time nurses on demand volatility vary by firm age bin. Although firms
of all ages decreased the percentage of full-time nurses as demand volatility increased (i.e.
the sign of slopes is all negative), the slope is smallest for youngest firms aged 0-12 months
in absolute value. Then the slope becomes steeper as firms age until they are 4 years old.
However, the slope increases (in absolute values) stop once firms reach age 4 or more: these
oldest firms behave more like the youngest firms in their labor mix responses. This reversal
can be explained by low levels of demand volatility or the leveling out in determinants of
the labor mix, such as the strength of referral network, demand size, and demand volatility.
The analysis above shows that firms’ labor mix responses to demand volatility systemat-
ically vary by firm age, a proxy of firm reputation. In particular, firms of all ages decreased
the percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility but the extent of decrease was
smaller among younger firms. However, is the systematic di↵erence across firm ages in the
relationships between the percentage of full-time nurses and demand volatility actually driven
by firms’ reputation among referral sources? The extent to which young firms can downsize
the full-time workforce in response to higher demand volatility might be more limited for
di↵erent reasons. For example, there might be a minimum necessary number of full-time
nurses for the business operation, such as if firms need full-time nurses with good knowledge
of designing care plans and documenting cases, or manage temporary nurses. Then young
firms that are small would respond to demand volatility by decreasing the percentage of
full-time nurses by a less amount, as shown in Figure 5. Moreover, as shown in previous
figures, not only the measures of reputation but also demand environments substantially
changed as firms aged. Therefore, for a rigorous test of the model’s predictions, in the next
25It is the change in the correlation between demand volatility and labor mix that I aim to estimate, not
the level of labor mix.
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section, I present and estimate an econometric model controlling for other covariates that
determine firms’ labor mix.
6.2 Empirical Specification
Using the main specification below, I investigate how firms’ reputation among the referral
sources is related to firms’ labor mix responses to demand volatility. I look at changes in the
percentage of full-time nurses within a firm in response to an increase in demand volatility,
and use interaction terms between demand volatility and measures of firm reputation. The
estimating equations are of the form
yit “   `   ¨DVit `DVit ¨Rep1it ¨ ✓ `Rep1it ¨   ` ↵i ` µt `X1it ¨ ⌘ ` ✏it, (21)
where yit is the percentage of active full-time nurses in firm i on week t. The key right-
hand-side variables are a measure of demand volatility, DVit, and interaction of the demand
volatility with a vector of di↵erent reputation measures, Repit, as described in Section 6.1.
Since I want to look at changes within firms, I include firm fixed e↵ects ↵i, which allow
me to control for potential geography-specific market or legislative factors and di↵erences in
time-constant management styles across firms. I also include week-year fixed e↵ects µt to
control for any industry-wide shifts in or seasonal e↵ects on the labor mix. In the vector Xit,
I include other firm-week level covariates, such as 7 indicators for firm age year bins (omitted
category is the indicator for the firm’s first year) or log firm age, log of total demand volume,
log of total active nursing workforce size, and the turnover rate among full-time nurses.26
To facilitate the interpretation of interaction term coe cients, I nonparametrically esti-
mate the equation (21) using two quantile indicator variables for having 33-66th percentile
(“high”) values or 66-100th percentile (“very high”) values of each reputation measure (omit-
ted category is the lowest quantile for smallest values). For each reputation measure, I use
quantile cuto↵s based on the firm-specific distribution of all weeks within each one-year firm
age bin.27 The coe cients ✓ are identified from changes in the correlation between the labor
26The turnover rate is measured by a ratio of the number of full-time nurses leaving the workforce to the
total number of active nurses for each firm-week.
27I create di↵erent cuto↵s for each firm age bin to adjust for di↵erent ranges in the reputation measures
across firm ages, as shown in Figure 2, and allow for comparing the e↵ects of reputation across firms of
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mix and demand volatility during weeks when a firm has particularly high reputation given
the firm age, compared to weeks when a firm has low reputation. The coe cients ✓ will
reflect how the correlations between the percentage of full-time nurses and demand volatility
change when each of di↵erent measures of reputation increases to “high” or “very high” val-
ues. The key coe cient   of our interest will reflect the correlation between the percentage
of full-time nurses and demand volatility when firms have low values of reputation by all
measures.
6.3 E↵ects of Reputation on Firms’ Labor Mix Responses to Demand Volatility
Table 9 shows the results from estimating the within-firm specification (21) controlling
for a di↵erent combination of reputation measures described in Section 6.1. In the baseline
specifications in columns (1) and (2) using the full sample period of 2012–2015, I include in
Repit, 1) the size and dispersion of referral network, respectively—one at a time since they
are highly correlated with each other—and 2) the consistency of referral network in both
columns. In columns (3) and (4), I add a new measure of reputation which is available only
for the sub-sample period of 2012–2014: the importance as a referral partner to the network.
The results in all columns of Table 9 show that when firms were in the bottom third
of reputation levels during the firm age year bin, they increased the percentage of full-time
nurses in response to an increase in demand volatility. The coe cients on demand volatility
in the first row are statistically significant at the 5% level at least except in column (2)
where it is significant at the 10% level. The magnitudes implied by the coe cients are small,
however, since demand volatility ranges from 0 to around 1. In columns (1) and(2), given the
mean percentage of full-time nurses of 34%, firms with low reputation by all measures hired
about 3% more full-time nurses when demand volatility increased by one standard deviation
(SD) (0.04). In columns (3) and(4), when firms had low reputation in one more dimension—
the importance as a referral partner—firms hired about 5% more full-time nurses, higher
than in columns (1) and (2), in response to one SD (0.05) increase in demand volatility.
Moreover, firms with higher reputation by any one of the measures shifted their labor
mix responses to demand volatility towards fewer full-time nurses, as shown by the negative
similar tenure.
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coe cients on interaction terms. The negative coe cients on interaction terms are also
greater in absolute values and more likely to be statistically significant for the top quantile
indicators for each reputation measure. Suppose firms initially had lowest values by all
measures of reputation, and only one of the reputation measures increased at a time. When
firms had “very high” referral consistency in columns (2)–(4), they increased the percentage
of full-time nurses in response to one SD increase in demand volatility by 1-3% rather than
3-5% when they had low reputation by all measures. These e↵ects are statistically significant
at the 5% level. When firms had a “very large” referral network in columns (1) and (3),
they increased the percentage of full-time nurses in response to one SD increase in demand
volatility by about 1-2% rather than 3-5% when they had low reputation by all measures.
However, these e↵ects are less precisely estimated and statistically significant at the 10%
level only.
Another insight gained from Table 9 is that referral consistency is a measure of reputation
to which firms were most sensitive when they had the least dispersed referral network.
In columns (2) and (4), firms shifted their labor mix responses to demand volatility by a
statistically significant amount when referral consistency increased despite low dispersion
of referrals. However, the sensitivity to referral consistency is smaller and less precisely
estimated when firms had the smallest referral network, as shown in columns (1) and (3).
Therefore, in the next analyses, I focus on the specifications in which the dispersion and
consistency of referral networks are controlled for.
The findings from Table 9 show that firms with lower reputation than expected for those
in the firm age-year hired more full-time nurses in response to higher demand volatility than
firms with higher reputation. However, firms at higher ages have higher levels of reputation,
as shown in Figure 2. Do firms with low reputation increase the percentage of full-time nurses
in response to higher demand volatility regardless of firm age and levels of reputation? The
theory in Section 3 predicts that firms with lower levels of reputation—i.e. younger firms—
increase the percentage of full-time nurses by even more than firms with higher levels of
reputation. To investigate this, I separately estimate the equation (21) for firms in di↵erent
age bins. I divide firm-week observations into three groups by firm age: 1) firms aged 0–12
months; 2) firms aged 12–48 months; and 3) firms aged 48 or more months. I will use the full
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sample to increase the sample size for statistical power since the results were qualitatively
similar and full-sample results showed more conservative estimates. I also replace the firm
age year indicators with a continuous log firm age variable.
Table 10 shows that the main e↵ect of demand volatility and interaction e↵ects from
referral consistency are only statistically significant at the 5% level and substantially larger
among youngest firms aged 0–12 months. From column (1), when the new firms had lower
reputation by all measures, they increased the percentage of full-time nurses by 24% in
response to one SD (0.08) increase in demand volatility. When these new firms had “high”
referral consistency, while all the other reputation measures remained in the lowest quantiles,
firms increased the percentage of full-time nurses by 6% only in response to one SD increase
in demand volatility. When new firms had “very high” referral consistency, it nullified firms’
increase in the full-time nurse use in response to higher demand volatility. In contrast,
results in columns (2) and (3) show that the coe cient signs are rather opposite and also
not precisely estimated even though the sample sizes are greater. These findings reinforce
my model’s predictions.
How did firms adjust their nursing workforce hired in other employment arrangements
beyond full-time nurses? For example, do low-reputation firms also decrease the use of tem-
porary nurses in response to an increase in demand volatility? If so, do they di↵erentially
treat directly hired on-call nurses and independently contracted nurses? Since the dependent
variable is the percentage of nurses hired in each arrangement, the sum of the percentages
across di↵erent arrangements is 100%, leading mechanically to opposite signs of regression
coe cients. Despite this issue, it is plausible that firms have heterogeneous responses to
demand volatility by employment arrangements even among permanent or temporary con-
tracts. Thus, I estimate the equation (21) among the youngest firms aged 0–12 months using
the percentage of active nurses hired in each arrangement as the dependent variable.
Table 11 shows the results where columns are placed in the descending order of organi-
zational attachment of the arrangements (except the “O ce/Other” category in column (6)
representing o ce or other employees whose primary duty is not to visit patients). Column
(1) reports the same results as in column (1) of Table 10 for full-time nurses while columns
(2)–(6) show the results for nurses hired in part-time with benefits, part-time without ben-
34
efits, on-call, independent contractor, and o ce/other categories. In the first row, firms in
the bottom third of reputation levels by all measures during the first year decreased the
percentage of nurses hired in all other positions except in full-time positions. However, the
only statistically significant decrease was among independently contracted nurses, who have
the least organizational attachment. These lowest reputation firms decreased the percentage
of contractor nurses by 21% when demand volatility increased by one SD. When firms had
high referral consistency but still with low referral dispersion, they increased the percentage
of contractor nurses by 20% in response to one-SD increase in demand volatility, nullifying
the decrease noted above. Both these e↵ects are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Moreover, when firms had higher reputation by either one of the measures, they generally
increased the percentage of nurses in temporary and other arrangements in columns (4)–(6)
though most coe cients are insignificant even at the 10% level.
The coe cients for nurses in part-time without benefits positions are both statistically
and economically insignificant given that these nurses account for only 1% of the workforce on
average. Results for part-time nurses with benefits are mixed: firms decreased the percentage
of these nurses when having a dispersed referral network by a statistically significant amount
but increased the percentage when having high referral consistency. Firms do not seem to
view these part-time nurses with benefits as substitutes for full-time nurses. Moreover, firms
seem to treat these nurses di↵erently when having a more dispersed network compared to
when having a more consistent referral network.
6.4 Alternative Explanations and Further Tests
6.4.1 Refuting the Alternative Explasnation by Firm Size
The findings from Tables 9 and 11 are consistent with my model’s predictions that reputa-
tion changes firms’ labor mix responses to demand volatility. Firms with lower reputation
increased the percentage of full-time nurses when demand volatility increased. However,
firms with higher reputation increased by less or rather decreased the percentage of full-time
nurses with demand volatility. These results are driven by youngest firms aged 0–12 months
which also had the lowest reputation by any measures. Furthermore, low-reputation firms
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simultaneously decreased the percentage of contractor nurses with demand volatility.
However, there is a potential concern that the e↵ect of reputation found above could be
driven by other factors. A plausible confounding factor is the firm size. Section 6.1 showed
that younger firms not only had lower reputation but also was smaller on average. Smaller
young firms may expect to grow in the future more rapidly. There could be unobserved
information about their formation of relationships with more referral sources, which I cannot
control for. If so, firms with lower reputation could be the small ones with greater expected
growth which, simultaneously, would increase the percentage of full-time nurses. Moreover,
smaller firms plausibly incur higher costs of attracting temporary nurses since they face
higher demand volatility, which could create more unstable work schedules for temporary
nurses. Smaller firms also may be capacity constrained and have a shortage of human
resources sta↵ who play a more important role in recruiting temporary workers. If these
were the cases, then young firms could respond to demand volatility by increasing full-time
or other permanent nurses purely due to a smaller size. I control for contemporaneous
demand and nursing workforce sizes on the right-hand side when estimating (21). However,
to the extent that firms have unobserved information on the demand growth forecast and
hiring costs, the coe cients   on demand volatility and ✓ on the interaction terms could be
contaminated by the omitted variable bias.
To disentangle the role of reputation among referral sources from the e↵ect of firm size, I
indirectly test whether the e↵ects of reputation among young firms in Table 10 are driven by
small young firms or large young firms. If it is large young firms that drive the results, then
I can rule out the alternative explanation by the firm size. In Table 12 I report the results
from estimating (21) separately for small and large young firms in each firm age group shown
in Table 10. Large firms are defined as those in each firm age year bin having their mean
total demand volume during the age year above the median.28 Columns (1) and (2) show
that among the new firms aged 0–12 months, it is only the large firms that increased the
percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility when firms had low reputation by all
measures. The magnitude of this labor mix is both statistically and economically significant
28I define whether a firm is large separately for each firm age year bin since firms’ size varies by age. Thus,
one firm can be large in one age year and small in another age year.
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only among these large new firms. When the large new firms were at the bottom third of
reputation levels by all measures, they increased the percentage of full-time nurses by 16%
in response to one SD (0.05) increase in demand volatility. When these firms had very high
reputation—i.e. a very dispersed referral network or very high referral consistency—they
increased the percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility by smaller amounts but
these e↵ects are not statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, it appears that large
new firms increased the percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility, regardless of
their reputation levels.
Similarly, I examine whether small and large firms among older firms behaved di↵erently
from each other in columns (3)–(6). Although I do not find any statistically significant e↵ects
among old firms in Table 10, the e↵ects might di↵er by the firm size. Among these older
firms, dispersion of referral network is a statistically and economically significant factor that
shifts firms’ labor mix responses to demand volatility. However, there are less clear patterns
among the older firms, indicating that these firms view the dispersion and consistency of
referral network di↵erently.
Among older firms aged 12–48 months, both small and large firms slightly decreased the
percentage of full-time nurses in response to demand volatility when they had low reputation
by all measures. The coe cients are not statistically significant at the 10% level, however.
Moreover, counterintuitively, when large firms had a dispersed or very dispersed referral
network but with low referral consistency, they increased the percentage of full-time nurses
with demand volatility by a statistically amount at the 5% level. Both results contrast with
previous results on youngest firms aged 0–12 months. These large firms may increase the
percentage of full-time nurses to develop a more consistent referral network despite having
a dispersed network.
Among firms aged 48 or more months, large and small firms behaved di↵erently from
each other. Large oldest firms behaved more like new firms: they increased the percentage
of full-time nurses with demand volatility during low reputation periods, and decreased the
percentage of full-time nurses during very high reputation periods. However, only the latter
e↵ect is statistically significant at the 5% level when firms had a very dispersed referral
network. Small oldest firms behaved more like intermediate old firms: they decreased the
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percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility during low reputation periods (but by
a statistically non-significant amount) but increased the percentage of full-time nurses at the
10% significance level.
6.4.2 Falsificateion Test by Comparing with “Not New in Town” Firms
Table 12 reveals that the reputation e↵ects I am capturing are not driven by the firm size
e↵ects. I provide further evidence that firms’ reputation among referral sources determines
their labor mix responses to demand volatility by conducting a falsification test. In this
test, I compare “new in town” firms with “not new in town” firms, defined as those that
had previously existing branches in thecounty, the unit of market.29 All of the above results
supporting the role of reputation are based on the sample of “new in town” firms. I expect
to find no e↵ects of reputation among “not new in town” firms since they would be less
sensitive to the levels of reputation among referral sources. They can get more brand recog-
nition through previously established branch firms and be more likely to be receive referrals
even without improving quality (i.e. “piggybacking e↵ect”). This e↵ect would lead to a
particularly salient di↵erence in firms’ labor mix when firms have low reputation between
“new in town” firms and “not new in town” firms. The latter would not necessarily have to
increase the percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility.
This falsification test might be ine↵ective to the extent that low-reputation firms in
markets with previously existing branch firms try to internalize the reputation externality
(i.e. “reputation externality” e↵ect) (Jin and Leslie, 2009). “Not new in town” firms may
be more concerned about keeping up the high quality level if the consequence of low quality
signals is transmitted to the other firms in the same market. This concern will be greater
in markets with more existing branch firms. If this e↵ect prevails, “not new in town” firms
could behave just like “new in town” firms.
To empirically test for the piggybacking e↵ect and reputation externality e↵ect, I reesti-
mate (21) using the sample of all “not new in town” firms and report the results in Table 13.
In column (1), I no longer find that firms increase the percentage of full-time nurses with
29I conduct robustness check using di↵erent units of markets with di↵erent scopes–Hospital Referral Re-
gions (HRRs), which define larger market areas, and Hospital Service Areas (HSAs), which define smaller
market areas—and find qualitatively similar results.
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demand volatility when having low reputation by all measures, by statistically significant
amounts the 10% level. This statistically insignificant estimate provides evidence for the
piggybacking e↵ect: “not new in town” firms do not have to adjust their labor mix to im-
prove quality despite low reputation levels because there are non-quality channels through
which to grow referral networks.
Although “not new in town” firms can piggyback on previously existing firms’ reputation
and do not have to shift their labor mix towards full-time nurses, there can also be a repu-
tation externality e↵ect. Do low-reputation firms in markets with more incumbent branch
firms want to keep up the quality level so as not to tarnish the reputation of the others and
internalize the reputation externality? To assess this possibility, I divide firms in column (1)
and into firms in markets with only one previously existing firm, presented in column (2),
and firms in markets with two to four previously existing firms, presented in column (3).
Columns (2) and (3) provide evidence for the reputation externality e↵ect. In column (3),
firms in markets with two or more existing firms increased the percentage of full-time nurses
with demand volatility by a statistically significant amount at the 1% level when having low
reputation by all measures. In contrast, in column (2), when firms had only one existing firm
with no pressure to internalize the reputation externality, they had a small and statistically
insignificant e↵ect. This result is even despite the fact that in markets with only one existing
firm, the extent of reputation on which the firms can piggyback is more limited.
There are contrasting signs on the interaction terms with referral dispersion and consis-
tency, which suggests that “not new in town” firms behave in a more complex way than “new
in town” firms. “Not new in town” firms increased the percentage of full-time nurses with
demand volatility by statistically significant amounts when having higher reputation mea-
sured by more dispersed referral networks while having low referral consistency. However,
the opposite was true when having higher referral consistency while having concentrated
referral networks. These firms decreased the percentage of full-time nurses with demand
volatility when having higher referral consistency. I conjecture that these di↵erent signs
of e↵ects might be driven by the di↵erence in how each measure of reputation a↵ects the
amount of pressure to internalize the reputation externality. When “not new in town” firms
had more dispersed referral network, which is more amenable to the contagion of low repu-
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tation, firms increased the percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility. However,
when firms had higher referral consistency, which does not correspond to easier information
transmission, firms decreased the percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility.
Table 14 reports the results for the percentage of active nurses hired in di↵erent employ-
ment arrangements separately among young “not new in town” firms aged 0–12 months.
In the first row, when these new firms had low reputation by all measures, they did not
increase the percentage of full-time nurses with demand volatility by a statistical significant
amount. Moreover, in column (5), they rather increased the percentage of contractor nurses
with demand volatility by a statistically significant amount at the 5% level. The interac-
tion e↵ects also tend to have opposite signs to those for “new in town” firms, which seem
counterintuitive if one were to explain these by reputation.
7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that firms’ reputation is an important determinant of workforce
composition in the face of demand shocks. I find that firms with weaker reputations, es-
pecially younger firms, employ larger shares of permanent nurses. This suggests that firms
forgo short-term profitability in order to achieve long-term reputation through improvements
in service quality. The empirical findings support this mechanism, as patients visited by a
higher proportion of full-time nurses were less likely to be rehospitalized.
These observations have important implications for both industry and policy. First, for
industry, this paper shows that starting firms strategically adjust their workforce composition
in order to grow their reputation for quality and increase their referral base. Whether this
is optimal for businesses and society would require a further examination of the endogenous
increases in referral volume and improvement quality as a result of the firms’ behaviors.
This could be a fruitful avenue for future research. Moreover, the paper shows that sta ng
is an important determinant of hospital readmissions in the home health space, and thus
reducing quality di↵erences between permanent and temporary labor could be a productive
policy target. Third, although the home health market has been widely viewed as having
low barriers to entry due to low capital requirements, this paper points to a new barrier
to entry since starting firms have to employ a higher share of permanent labor than more
40
established firms.
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Figure 1: Living close to full-time nurses and productive full-time nurses are
strong predictors of getting more full-time nurse visits.
Notes: I fit a linear line. Each plot shows a di↵erent variable on the x-axis. The first (left-most) panel
shows the relative distance to each nearby nurse (defined as the straight-line distance minus the nurse’s
usual coverage radius); the second (middle) panel shows the number of each nearby nurse; and the third
(right-most) panel shows the workload of each nearby nurse.
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Figure 2: Measures of reputation by firm age
(a) Size of referral network (b) Dispersion of referral network
(c) Consistency of referral network
(d) Importance as a referral partner to the
network
Notes: In each panel, the lines plot fitted values, along with point-wise confidence intervals, of locally
weighted regressions (using R’s ggplot command with a geom smooth option) of each reputation measure
on firm age in years at the firm-week level. The size of referral network in Panel (a) is measured by the
number of unique hospital referral sources that has referred to a home health firm in the past 4 weeks,
including the current week. The dispersion of referral network in Panel (b) is measured by minus 1 times
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of referrals in the past 4 weeks. The consistency of referral network
in Panel (c) is measured by the percentage of weeks referred by the same hospital referral source in the past
4 weeks.
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Figure 3: Demand size and volatility by firm age
(a) Demand size (b) Demand volatility
(c) Variation in demand volatility
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Figure 4: Labor mix by firm’s age
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Figure 5: Relationship between demand volatility and percentage of full-time
nurses by firm age
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Notes: I plot linear fitted curves. I discretize continuous firm’s age values to their floor values.
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Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of the weekly number and percentage of of active skilled
nurses in each employment arrangement (N “ 11, 392)
N workers % workers
Arrangement Mean SD Mean SD
Total 9.49 5.46
Panel A. Salaried
Full-time salaried 4.07 3.35 40.15 24.04
Part-time with benefit 0.84 1.16 9.61 13.9
Part-time without benefit 0.41 0.77 3.81 7.57
Panel B. Piece-rate paid
On-call (direct hire) 2.96 2.38 32.47 21.48
Contractor 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.97
Panel C. O ce or other workers
O ce/other 1.2 1.15 13.88 14.62
Notes. The unit of observation is a firm-week cell. Salaried and
piece-rate paid workers in Panels A and B have a primary duty
of visiting patients. In Panel C, o ce workers are in charge of su-
pervisory or administrative work; other workers include workers
hired for hospice service, another segment of business operated by
the company.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of worker characteristics by employment arrangement for skilled
nurses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full-time On-call
Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A. Productivity per day
Number of visits 3.96 2.03 2.29 1.69
Number of visit points 4.45 2.24 2.60 1.89
Time spent on visits (hrs) 3.30 1.48 2.01 1.27
Mean visit length (hrs) 0.78 0.28 0.83 0.37
Panel B. Productivity per week
Number of visits 19.45 7.38 7.64 6.67
Number of visit points 21.88 8.17 8.70 7.32
Visit productivity 28.34 4.44
% productivity goal met 66.74 59.50
Number of days worked 5.12 1.65 3.35 1.91
Time spent on visits (hrs) 15.76 5.78 6.43 5.13
Mean visit length (hrs) 0.77 0.20 0.84 0.32
Panel C. Pay and human resources characteristics
Total weekly pay ($) 1,209.60 204.28 393.03 351.48
Per visit rate ($) 42.97 6.47 59.33 53.67
Tenure (months) 7.09 4.94 4.77 7.64
Panel D. Within-worker pay variation
Mean wage ($) 42.76 6.69 42.77 31.71
Std. Dev. wage 0.84 0.71 20.54 26.79
Coe cient of variation 0.02 0.02 0.45 0.47
Number of status changes 1.83 0.76 1.38 0.59
Notes. In Panel A, the unit of observation is a worker–day. In
Panel B, the unit of observation is a worker–week. In Panel C, the
unit of observation for tenure is a worker–employment arrange-
ment. In Panel D, the unit of observation is a worker–employment
arrangement. The number of status switches represents the num-
ber of switches in employment arrangements. Tenure represents
the length of employment under each employment arrangement,
and thus the total length of employment for a worker is greater
for workers who switch employment arrangements multiple times
(48% of workers do not change arrangements; 40% change 2-3
times; and the rest 4, 5, and 7 times). These summary statistics
are obtained conditional on working in the o ce.
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Table 3: Summary statistics and balancing of covariates in the patient sample
Quantile of % full-time nurse visits All
0% § p25 § p50 † 100 100% Mean Std Dev
Number of observations 2092 915 2,728 1,669 4,029 11,433
A. Hospital readmission and labor mix
Indicator for hospital readmission 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.16 0.37
Proportion of full-time nurse visits 0 0.18 0.58 0.85 1 0.63 0.39
Number of nurse visits 6.1 7.24 5.89 7.83 5.66 6.24 3.13
Number of nurse hando↵s 0.74 2.51 2.81 2.41 0.85 1.66 1.8
B. Instruments: Characteristics of proximate full-time (FT) and on-call (OC) nurses
distance to nearest FT (in miles) -1.42 -2.35 -2.51 -2.59 -2.51 -2.31 5.35
distance to 2nd nearest FT 2.44 1.23 0.83 0.54 0.75 1.09 5.36
distance to 3rd nearest FT 4.64 3.16 2.87 2.77 2.55 3.09 6.36
distance to nearest OC -2.77 -2.65 -3.09 -3.03 -2.34 -2.72 5.56
distance to 2nd nearest OC 1.18 1.08 0.64 0.78 1.6 1.13 5.61
distance to 3rd nearest OC 3.34 3.23 2.57 3.12 4.07 3.37 6.85
Number of nearest FT 1.14 1.18 1.25 1.3 1.28 1.24 0.5
Number of 2nd nearest FT 1.19 1.2 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.21 0.48
Number of 3rd nearest FT 1.12 1.18 1.2 1.19 1.18 1.17 0.46
Number of nearest OC 1.27 1.3 1.22 1.22 1.21 1.23 0.51
Number of 2nd nearest OC 1.27 1.23 1.18 1.21 1.19 1.21 0.47
Number of 3rd nearest OC 1.18 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.15 0.41
Total workload, nearest FT (in visits) 67.43 79.09 74.54 89.39 75.84 76.23 53.5
Total workload, 2nd nearest FT 67.15 76.87 71.18 88.64 75.14 74.84 53.88
Total workload, 3rd nearest FT 65.62 76.83 71.6 88.05 72.87 73.77 54.03
Total workload, nearest OC 27.68 28.96 23.59 27.51 22.09 24.81 28.86
Total workload, 2nd nearest OC 25.92 24.27 22.06 24.56 21.57 23.14 26.83
Total workload, 3rd nearest OC 23.94 23.34 21.66 23.38 19.51 21.71 26.72
C. O ce characteristics
Mean daily number of episodes 169.94 181.9 179.54 181.95 176.03 177.09 72.06
Mean daily number of active nurses 12.79 12.85 11.71 12.32 12.17 12.25 5.7
Mean daily proportion of full-time nurses 0.45 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.15
D. Patient demographics
Age 79.53 79.14 78.49 78.78 78.57 78.81 8.33
Female 0.6 0.58 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.49
White 0.83 0.8 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.41
Enrolled in per-visit paying Medicare Part C 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.4
Enrolled in per-episode paying Medicare Part C 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.23
Dual eligible 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09
No assistance available 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13
Living alone 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.43
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Table 3 – Continued
Quantile of % full-time nurse visits All
0% § p25 § p50 † 100 100% Mean Std Dev
E. Patient comorbidity characteristics
Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.15
Congestive heart failure (CHF) 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.36
Peripheral vascular disease (PVD) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14
Cerebrovascular disease (CEVD) 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.22
Dementia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09
Chronic pulmonary disease (COPD) 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.32
Rheumatic disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03
Peptic ulcer disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06
Mild liver disease 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0.07
Diabetes 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13
Diabetes + Complications 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.1
Hemiplegia or paraplegia (HP/PAPL) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04
Renal disease 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.19
Cancer 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.25
Moderate/severe liver disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05
Metastatic cancer 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.08
AIDS/HIV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01
Overall status: (Very bad) Progressive conditions 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.19
Overall status: (Bad) Remain in fragile health 0.29 0.3 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.3 0.46
Overall status: Temporarily facing high health risks 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.59 0.49
High risk factor: Alcohol dependency 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.15
High risk factor: Drug dependency 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09
High risk factor: Heavy smoking 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.34
High risk factor: Obesity 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.37
Pre-HHC condition: Disruptive behavior 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09
Pre-HHC condition: Impaired decision-making 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.35
Pre-HHC condition: Indwelling/Suprapublic catheter 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13
Pre-HHC condition: Intractable pain 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.31
Pre-HHC condition: Memory loss 0.12 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.31
Pre-HHC condition: Urinary incontinence 0.31 0.3 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.3 0.46
F. Patient high risk of hospitalization characteristics
Risk for hospitalization: History of 2+ falls 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.44
Risk for hospitalization: 2+ hospitalizations 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.42 0.4 0.4 0.49
Risk for hospitalization: Recent decline in Mental 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.27
Risk for hospitalization: Take 5+ medications 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.33
Risk for hospitalization: Other 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.1 0.09 0.29
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Table 4: IV First-stage results on the proportion of full-time nurse visits
Dep var: Proportion of full-time nurse visits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
distance to nearest FT 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
distance to 2nd nearest FT -0.0056˚˚ -0.0055˚˚ -0.0055˚˚ -0.0056˚˚
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
distance to 3rd nearest FT -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
distance to nearest OC -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
distance to 2nd nearest OC 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
distance to 3rd nearest OC 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Number of nearest FT 0.0695˚˚˚ 0.0695˚˚˚ 0.0699˚˚˚ 0.0689˚˚˚
(0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0187)
Number of 2nd nearest FT 0.0198 0.0203 0.0196 0.0197
(0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160)
Number of 3rd nearest FT 0.0017 0.0020 0.0012 0.0017
(0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0145)
Number of nearest OC -0.0183˚ -0.0183˚ -0.0188˚ -0.0185˚
(0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0090)
Number of 2nd nearest OC -0.0096 -0.0102 -0.0108 -0.0115
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Number of 3rd nearest OC 0.0106 0.0103 0.0090 0.0074
(0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0085)
Total workload, nearest FT 0.0003˚ 0.0003˚ 0.0003˚ 0.0003˚
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Total workload, 2nd nearest FT 0.0003˚˚˚ 0.0003˚˚˚ 0.0003˚˚˚ 0.0003˚˚˚
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Total workload, 3rd nearest FT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Total workload, nearest OC -0.0007˚ -0.0007˚ -0.0007˚ -0.0007˚
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Total workload, 2nd nearest OC -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Total workload, 3rd nearest OC -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Hospitalization risk controls . Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls . . Yes Yes
Comorbidity controls . . . Yes
Observations 11433 11433 11433 11433
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.36
F-statistic 30.98 31.97 35.18 32.05
Notes. Interaction terms of distance and workload are omitted. An observation
is a patient episode. In all columns, I control for mean of o ce-day level demand
and labor supply characteristics during the patient’s episode; and o ce fixed ef-
fects, patient’s ZIP code fixed e↵ects, fixed e↵ects for day of week, week of year,
and year of the last day of care, respectively.
O ce-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 5%; **signifi-
cant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%.
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Table 5: IV First-stage results on the number of nurse visits
Dep var: Number of nurse visits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
distance to nearest FT 0.0184 0.0183 0.0185 0.0195
(0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0112)
distance to 2nd nearest FT 0.0101 0.0098 0.0085 0.0088
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0138)
distance to 3rd nearest FT 0.0121 0.0117 0.0114 0.0115
(0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0107)
distance to nearest OC -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0010
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0064)
distance to 2nd nearest OC -0.0141˚ -0.0146˚ -0.0145˚ -0.0138˚
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0057)
distance to 3rd nearest OC -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0049
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0055)
Total workload, nearest FT 0.0115˚˚˚ 0.0115˚˚˚ 0.0115˚˚˚ 0.0115˚˚˚
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Total workload, 2nd nearest FT 0.0104˚˚˚ 0.0103˚˚˚ 0.0103˚˚˚ 0.0104˚˚˚
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Total workload, 3rd nearest FT 0.0086˚˚˚ 0.0086˚˚˚ 0.0086˚˚˚ 0.0086˚˚˚
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Total workload, nearest OC 0.0083˚˚ 0.0083˚˚ 0.0082˚˚ 0.0081˚˚
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Total workload, 2nd nearest OC 0.0077˚˚˚ 0.0077˚˚˚ 0.0077˚˚˚ 0.0076˚˚˚
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Total workload, 3rd nearest OC 0.0083˚˚˚ 0.0082˚˚˚ 0.0082˚˚˚ 0.0082˚˚˚
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Number of nearest FT 0.1237 0.1264 0.1323 0.1320
(0.0849) (0.0845) (0.0844) (0.0794)
Number of 2nd nearest FT -0.0024 -0.0004 -0.0041 -0.0107
(0.0590) (0.0582) (0.0581) (0.0577)
Number of 3rd nearest FT 0.0570 0.0565 0.0496 0.0423
(0.0869) (0.0859) (0.0880) (0.0879)
Number of nearest OC -0.0557 -0.0549 -0.0502 -0.0589
(0.0836) (0.0833) (0.0832) (0.0815)
Number of 2nd nearest OC 0.0435 0.0461 0.0481 0.0490
(0.1192) (0.1180) (0.1176) (0.1180)
Number of 3rd nearest OC 0.0373 0.0331 0.0295 0.0246
(0.0964) (0.0948) (0.0927) (0.0957)
Hospitalization risk controls . Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls . . Yes Yes
Comorbidity controls . . . Yes
Observations 11433 11433 11433 11433
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.14 0.15
F-statistic 328.19 317.51 295.32 267.81
Notes. Interaction terms of distance and workload are omitted. I control for o ce
fixed e↵ects, patient’s ZIP code fixed e↵ects, fixed e↵ects for day of week, week
of year, and year of the last day of care, respectively; and mean of o ce-day level
characteristics during the patient’s episode. The o ce-day level characteristics in-
clude the total number of episodes, total number of active nurses, and fraction of
active full-time nurses. O ce-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *sig-
nificant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%.
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Table 6: IV First-stage results on the number of nurse hando↵s
Dep var: Number of nurse hando↵s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
distance to nearest FT 0.0107 0.0108 0.0109 0.0113
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064)
distance to 2nd nearest FT 0.0057 0.0055 0.0047 0.0049
(0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0081)
distance to 3rd nearest FT 0.0142˚ 0.0140˚ 0.0135˚ 0.0132˚
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0057)
distance to nearest OC 0.0050 0.0050 0.0053 0.0053
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0039)
distance to 2nd nearest OC -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0075
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049)
distance to 3rd nearest OC -0.0065˚ -0.0066˚ -0.0064˚ -0.0065˚
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029)
Total workload, nearest FT 0.0018˚˚ 0.0019˚˚ 0.0019˚˚˚ 0.0019˚˚˚
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Total workload, 2nd nearest FT 0.0029˚˚˚ 0.0028˚˚˚ 0.0028˚˚˚ 0.0028˚˚˚
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Total workload, 3rd nearest FT 0.0015˚ 0.0015˚ 0.0015˚ 0.0015˚
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Total workload, nearest OC 0.0024˚ 0.0024˚ 0.0023˚ 0.0023˚
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Total workload, 2nd nearest OC 0.0024˚ 0.0025˚ 0.0024˚˚ 0.0023˚
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Total workload, 3rd nearest OC 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Number of nearest FT -0.0142 -0.0132 -0.0115 -0.0103
(0.0452) (0.0447) (0.0449) (0.0436)
Number of 2nd nearest FT -0.0246 -0.0254 -0.0253 -0.0324
(0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0608) (0.0569)
Number of 3rd nearest FT 0.0746 0.0736 0.0715 0.0682
(0.0581) (0.0579) (0.0589) (0.0587)
Number of nearest OC 0.0841 0.0843 0.0856 0.0820
(0.0536) (0.0526) (0.0535) (0.0526)
Number of 2nd nearest OC 0.0650 0.0681 0.0706 0.0715
(0.0525) (0.0518) (0.0509) (0.0505)
Number of 3rd nearest OC -0.0398 -0.0403 -0.0397 -0.0378
(0.0732) (0.0726) (0.0716) (0.0706)
Hospitalization risk controls . Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls . . Yes Yes
Comorbidity controls . . . Yes
Observations 11433 11433 11433 11433
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.19
F-statistic 29.09 28.52 23.06 22.03
Notes. Interaction terms of distance and workload are omitted. I control for o ce
fixed e↵ects, patient’s ZIP code fixed e↵ects, fixed e↵ects for day of week, week
of year, and year of the last day of care, respectively; and mean of o ce-day level
characteristics during the patient’s episode. The o ce-day level characteristics in-
clude the total number of episodes, total number of active nurses, and fraction of
active full-time nurses. O ce-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *sig-
nificant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%.
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Table 7: IV Second-stage results on the e↵ect of proportion of full-time nurse
visits on the probability of hospital readmission
Dep var: Indicator for being rehospitalized
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of full-time nurse visits -0.1772˚˚˚ -0.1803˚˚˚ -0.1852˚˚˚ -0.2018˚˚˚
(0.0395) (0.0403) (0.0390) (0.0367)
Number of nurse visits 0.0560˚˚˚ 0.0515˚˚˚ 0.0537˚˚˚ 0.0513˚˚˚
(0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0032)
Number of nurse hando↵s -0.0738˚˚˚ -0.0675˚˚˚ -0.0750˚˚˚ -0.0782˚˚˚
(0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0175)
Hospitalization risk controls . Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls . . Yes Yes
Comorbidity controls . . . Yes
R-squared -0.30 -0.28 -0.30 -0.30
J-statistic p-value 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.46
Observations 11433 11433 11433 11433
Mean dep var 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
SD of proportion of full-time nurse visits 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Notes. I control for o ce fixed e↵ects, week of year fixed e↵ects and year fixed e↵ects. O ce-level
clustered standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at
0.1%.
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Table 8: Summary statistics, workforce composition, reputation and other firm
characteristics (N “ 7, 370)
Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A. Workforce composition
Percentage of active on-call nurses 31.90 18.95
Panel B. Distribution and strength of relationships
Number of relationships 10.05 5.47
HHI relationships 0.32 0.19
Relationship strength by time 0.60 0.22
Relationship strength by size 2.17 2.44
Firm age (in years) 3.57 1.98
Panel C. Demand characteristics
Demand volatility 0.06 0.03
Ongoing episodes 130.09 72.11
Recent demand growth 0.00 0.03
Number of non-hospital referrals 7.92 6.38
Panel D. Labor supply characteristics
Total number of active nurses 10.14 4.95
# full-time nurses absent on weekdays 5.81 5.82
Turnover gap, on-call–full-time 5.64 14.82
Voluntary turnover rate among on-call nurses (%) 6.09 14.40
Voluntary turnover rate among full-time nurses (%) 0.44 3.31
Panel E. Human resources characteristics
Productivity gap, on-call–full-time -5.56 5.03
Weekly productivity of on-call nurses (in visits) 1.91 1.43
Weekly productivity of full-time nurses (in visits) 7.48 4.86
Wage gap, on-call–full-time 11.20 27.90
Mean wage of on-call nurses 53.25 23.35
Mean wage of full-time nurses 43.19 5.68
Standard deviation of on-call nurse wage 13.05 25.86
Panel E. Market characteristics
Mean % change in referrals in the HRR 0.10 0.46
Home health market HHI 0.13 0.11
Notes. The unit of analysis is a firm-week cell.
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Table 9: E↵ects of Reputation on Firms’ Labor Mix Responses to Demand
Volatility
Dep var: Percentage of active full-time nurses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand volatility (DV) 27.55*** 25.07* 33.97*** 31.96**
(9.29) (13.07) (9.81) (13.68)
Interaction with the size of referral network
DV X Large referral network -9.20 -13.86
(8.17) (9.89)
DV X Very large referral network -17.59* -18.05*
(8.96) (9.02)
Interaction with the dispersion of referral network
DV X Dispersed referral network 6.70 5.14
(12.45) (11.61)
DV X Very dispersed referral network -15.58 -14.57
(15.51) (15.36)
Interaction with the consistency of referral network
DV X High referral consistency -13.64 -18.55** -8.51 -13.43*
(8.64) (7.97) (7.84) (7.74)
DV X Very high referral consistency -11.66 -19.35** -16.27* -23.88**
(8.14) (9.18) (8.13) (10.17)
Interaction with the importance as a referral partner
DV X High importance as referral partner -2.82 -6.05
(8.93) (8.06)
DV X Very high importance as referral partner -1.86 -4.84
(9.17) (8.37)
Observations 7,233 7,233 5,503 5,503
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30
Mean dependent variable 33.68 33.68 32.76 32.76
Standard deviation of demand volatility 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
O ce fixed e↵ects Y Y Y Y
Week-year fixed e↵ects Y Y Y Y
Notes. In all specifications, I control for 7 indicators for firm age year bins (omitted category is the indi-
cator for the firm’s first year), log of total demand volume, log of total active nursing workforce size, and
the turnover rate among full-time nurses. In columns (1) and (2), I use the full sample period of 2012–
2015. In columns (3) and (4), I use the sub-sample period of 2012–2014 due to limited data availability for
the new reputation measure introduced in these columns. Firm-level clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 10: E↵ects of Reputation on Firms’ Labor Mix Responses to Demand
Volatility by Firm Age
Dep var: Percentage of active full-time nurses
(1) (2) (3)
Firm age 0-12 months 12-48 months 48+ months
Demand volatility (DV) 75.72*** -2.61 7.71
(19.10) (19.83) (16.08)
Interaction with the dispersion of referral network
DV X Dispersed referral network -0.23 15.96 22.06
(9.31) (12.72) (17.64)
DV X Very dispersed referral network -21.39 21.89 -23.55
(35.91) (23.56) (14.47)
Interaction with the consistency of referral network
DV X High referral consistency -55.42** 3.44 -13.65
(25.07) (14.28) (15.58)
DV X Very high referral consistency -75.25*** 3.62 -9.25
(24.83) (15.74) (13.11)
Observations 639 3,729 2,865
R-squared 0.43 0.32 0.42
Mean dependent variable 25.62 30.95 39.02
Standard deviation of demand volatility 0.08 0.04 0.04
O ce fixed e↵ects Y Y Y
Week-year fixed e↵ects Y Y Y
Notes. In all specifications, I control for log firm age, log of total demand volume, log of total active nurs-
ing workforce size, and the turnover rate among full-time nurses. Firm-level clustered standard errors in
parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 11: E↵ects of Reputation on Firms’ Labor Mix Responses to Demand Volatility among New Firms Aged 0–12 Months
Dep var: Percentage of active nurses in each arrangement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full-time
Part-time
with benefit
Part-time
w/o benefit On-call Contractor
O ce/Other
Demand volatility (DV) 75.72*** -8.86 -1.20 -13.82 -33.73** -18.11
(19.10) (11.86) (2.42) (18.67) (14.01) (15.51)
Interaction with the dispersion of referral network
DV X Dispersed referral network -0.23 -13.33** 0.66 12.34 1.54 -0.97
(9.31) (5.86) (1.24) (12.56) (7.02) (7.71)
DV X Very dispersed referral network -21.39 -4.82 2.33 23.95 1.79 -1.85
(35.91) (10.94) (5.83) (23.13) (18.39) (23.55)
Interaction with the consistency of referral network
DV X High referral consistency -55.42** 10.00 -0.87 -4.32 32.72** 17.90
(25.07) (10.03) (2.20) (23.27) (14.21) (22.27)
DV X Very high referral consistency -75.25*** 21.17 -0.67 12.58 15.90 26.26
(24.83) (13.18) (2.88) (14.83) (20.50) (18.88)
Observations 639 639 639 639 639 639
R-squared 0.43 0.38 0.52 0.45 0.45 0.33
Mean dependent variable 25.62 7.59 1.33 40.25 13.04 12.17
Standard deviation of demand volatility 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
O ce fixed e↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Week-year fixed e↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes. In all specifications, I control for log firm age, log of total demand volume, log of total active nursing workforce size, and the turnover rate
among full-time nurses. In columns (1) and (2), I use the full sample period of 2012–2015. In columns (3) and (4), I use the sub-sample period of
2012–2014 due to limited data availability for the new reputation measure introduced in these columns. Firm-level clustered standard errors in
parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 12: E↵ects of Reputation on Firms’ Labor Mix Responses to Demand
Volatility by Firm Age and Firm Size
Dep var: Percentage of active full-time nurses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm age 0-12 months 12-48 months 48+ months
Firm size Small Large Small Large Small Large
Demand volatility (DV) 2.98 87.42** -6.80 -10.49 -21.84 26.06
(55.17) (34.01) (27.56) (22.22) (17.10) (15.03)
Interaction with the dispersion of referral network
DV X Dispersed referral network 4.52 16.94 0.24 48.89** 40.77* -39.22
(10.90) (26.36) (12.15) (21.47) (20.67) (26.78)
DV X Very dispersed referral network 22.45 -28.73 18.07 55.13*** 24.57 -61.82**
(31.85) (52.88) (31.07) (19.24) (16.80) (26.97)
Interaction with the consistency of referral network
DV X High referral consistency -8.72 -86.05 1.41 -0.47 -11.95 10.41
(46.77) (51.40) (19.23) (20.99) (18.44) (11.83)
DV X Very high referral consistency 18.54 -75.34 0.14 10.48 0.42 -23.34
(67.16) (45.12) (21.63) (21.49) (15.90) (19.80)
Observations 181 458 1,780 1,949 1,320 1,545
R-squared 0.91 0.38 0.44 0.29 0.55 0.39
Mean dependent variable 22.09 27.01 22.89 38.32 33.06 44.12
Standard deviation of demand volatility 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02
O ce fixed e↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Week-year fixed e↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes. In all specifications, I control for log firm age, log of total demand volume, log of total active nurs-
ing workforce size, and the turnover rate among full-time nurses. Firm-level clustered standard errors in
parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 13: E↵ects of Reputation on Firms’ Labor Mix Responses to Demand Volatility among
“Not New in Town” Firms
Dep var: Percentage of active full-time nurses
(1) (2) (3)
All 1 Existing firm 2+ Existing firms
Demand volatility (DV) 15.33 4.00 53.95***
(16.82) (19.24) (8.35)
Interaction with the dispersion of referral network
DV X Dispersed referral network 24.23* 26.29* -3.25
(12.05) (12.94) (2.83)
DV X Very dispersed referral network 76.14** 97.86** 30.76*
(25.85) (35.15) (11.53)
Interaction with the consistency of referral network
DV X High referral consistency -31.64** -23.27 -22.84
(14.51) (18.75) (17.72)
DV X Very high referral consistency -23.34 -20.91 -13.49
(16.43) (21.07) (17.04)
Observations 1,595 1,248 347
R-squared 0.43 0.46 0.85
Number of firms 13 9 4
Mean dependent variable 38.91 39.21 37.82
Standard deviation of demand volatility 0.09 0.08 0.11
O ce fixed e↵ects Y Y Y
Week-year fixed e↵ects Y Y Y
Notes. In all specifications, I control for 7 indicators for firm age year bins (omitted category is the indi-
cator for the firm’s first year), log of total demand volume, log of total active nursing workforce size, and
the turnover rate among full-time nurses. In columns (1) and (2), I use the full sample period of 2012–
2015. In columns (3) and (4), I use the sub-sample period of 2012–2014 due to limited data availability for
the new reputation measure introduced in these columns. Firm-level clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
60
Table 14: E↵ects of Reputation on Firms’ Labor Mix Responses to Demand Volatility among “Not New in Town” Firms Aged 0–12
Months
Dep var: Percentage of active nurses in each arrangement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full-time
Part-time
with benefit
Part-time
w/o benefit On-call Contractor
O ce/Other
Demand volatility (DV) 9.90 15.58* 1.81 -9.52 3.41** -21.18**
(12.57) (8.27) (2.13) (10.09) (1.28) (9.02)
Interaction with the dispersion of referral network
DV X Dispersed referral network 20.27** -18.89* 4.78 -23.56*** 8.14** 9.27
(6.95) (9.39) (2.78) (6.38) (2.56) (10.96)
DV X Very dispersed referral network -6.84 5.97 0.33 21.49 10.55 -31.50**
(28.17) (21.79) (10.99) (28.14) (10.70) (13.38)
Interaction with the consistency of referral network
DV X High referral consistency 8.17 -12.70 -7.96 -41.10*** -6.58 60.17**
(8.70) (6.85) (5.85) (10.83) (6.32) (22.43)
DV X Very high referral consistency -2.00 -4.87 -2.73 6.06 -4.43 7.97
(9.01) (4.87) (2.50) (12.07) (3.10) (5.09)
Observations 357 357 357 357 357 357
R-squared 0.59 0.46 0.54 0.58 0.50 0.54
Mean dependent variable 39.92 11.88 3.50 32.68 4.68 7.34
Standard deviation of demand volatility 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
O ce fixed e↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Week-year fixed e↵ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes. In all specifications, I control for log firm age, log of total demand volume, log of total active nursing workforce size, and the turnover rate
among full-time nurses. In columns (1) and (2), I use the full sample period of 2012–2015. In columns (3) and (4), I use the sub-sample period of
2012–2014 due to limited data availability for the new reputation measure introduced in these columns. Firm-level clustered standard errors in
parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
61
A Home health care industry
Home health care, which is provided to homebound patients who need skilled nursing or
therapy services, is an important and rapidly growing segment of the post-acute care delivery
system. The number of home health agencies (HHAs), which are the major providers of home
health care, had grown from 9,291 to 12,461 by 34% between 2007 and 2014 while Medicare
fee-for-service (FFS) spending on HHAs has increased from $22.8 billion to $29.1 billion by
28% during the same period (MedPAC, 2016a). Moreover, between 2006 and 2014, home
health care had the highest growth of 3.1% as a destination for all Medicare fee-for-service
(FFS) patients who were discharged from an acute care hospital (MedPAC, 2016a).
This rapid growth may be attributed to its appeal to patients who prefer to recover at
home, providers who prefer to shorten hospitalization lengths, and insurers who benefit from
cheaper care at home than care in brick-and-mortar institutions. A demographic change from
aging population and technological advancement allowing for the care delivery at home—
including greater curative capacity of drugs which can be easily administered at home and
evolution of medical and telecommunications devices facilitating mobility of care delivery—
also contribute to the growth of home health care. Not surprisingly, the number of Medicare
FFS home health care users has grown by 36% and FFS spending for home health care has
risen by 108% during 2000–2014 (MedPAC, 2016b). The importance of home health care has
also increased with the rise of enhanced care coordination and shared savings models such
as Accountable Care Organizations or Bundled Payments for Care Improvement as well as
financial incentives to prevent hospital readmissions, known as the Hospital Readmissions
Reduction Program, under the A↵ordable Care Act (David and Kim, 2016).
For the source of payment, health insurance, and particularly Medicare, are primary
payers for home health care. 88% of the national home health expenditures in freestanding
HHAs are paid for by health insurance, 9% by out-of-pocket payments, and 3% by other third-
party payers and programs (MedPAC, 2016b).30 Within health insurance, Medicare is the
largest payer, paying for 42% of the national home health care expenditures while Medicaid
and private health insurance pay for 36% and 22%, respectively (MedPAC, 2016a). In our
30HHAs can largely be either freestanding (85% of all HHAs as of 2014) or hospital-based (MedPAC,
2016a).
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data, Medicare is an even more dominant source of payment, accounting for 69% of episodes
in each month in my data. Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) makes prospective payment on
the basis of a national standardized 60-day episode payment rate that is adjusted for the
applicable case-mix and wage indices (Federal Register, 2014). A home health admission
can comprise multiple episodes with renewal of another 60-day episode for patients requiring
more home health care.31 Since Medicare FFS is a dominant payer, I measure the quantity
of demand provided by firms using the number of 60-day episodes, as I will elaborate in
Section 4. Moreover, I assume a fixed price in my model in Section 3.
B Home health care workforce
There are six home health service disciplines covered by Medicare: skilled nursing (SN),
home health aide (HH), physical therapy (PT), speech-language pathology (ST), occupa-
tional therapy (OT), and medical social services (MSW). In Table 15, I report the summary
statistics of the number of workers firms employ each week for each of these disciplines and
two additional disciplines they provide service for, fitness specialists (FS) and registered
dietitians (RD). Each week, firms hire 13 skilled nurses—either registered nurses (RNs) or
licensed practice nurses (LPNs), though mostly RNs—on average, and for the largest num-
ber of weeks compared to other disciplines. Firms hire 11 physical therapists on each week
on average and for nearly as many weeks as skilled nurses. The payment rate is increased
when the episode involves a higher number of therapy visits, leading to high employment of
physical therapists in HHAs. However, for other therapy disciplines, such as occupational
therapy and speech-language pathology, firms hire 5 and 2 workers per week on average.
These smaller numbers reflect lower demand for these services. Firms hire 4 home health
aides each week on average but not for as many weeks.
31In comparison, most private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans make payment on the basis of per-visit
rate with di↵erent cost sharing according to plans. In the data, 25% of MA episodes are paid for on the
60-day episode basis, and 75% on the per-visit basis.
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Table 15: Mean and standard deviation of the number of workers in each home health service
discipline across firm-week observations
Discipline N Mean SD
Discipline N Mean SD
Skilled nursing (SN) 108,416 12.66 6.19
Physical therapy (PT) 90,820 10.82 4.9
Occupational therapy (OT) 41,046 5.39 2.89
Home health aide (Aide) 24,746 3.66 2.73
Fitness specialist (FS) 411 3.09 1.45
Speech-language pathology (ST) 16,683 2.34 1.34
Medical social services (MSW) 10,728 1.4 0.63
Registered dietitian (RD) 1,451 1.16 0.42
Notes. A single person may be counted multiple times if
they have multiple disciplines in the same firm-week. How-
ever, these cases are rare, accounting for less than 1% of
observations.
C Proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1) I examine the e↵ect of   on p˚ relative to the e↵ect of   on s˚. By
total di↵erentiation of (12), I obtain
Bst˚
B  “
1
2c
2
pppt˚ q
?
Rt
c2spst˚ q ` 12c2pppt˚ q
(22)
Bpt˚
B  “
a
Rt ´ Bst˚B  “
c2spst˚ q
?
Rt
c2spst˚ q ` 12c2pppt˚ q
. (23)
Thus, when demand volatility   increases, p˚ increases faster than s˚ if
Bpt˚
B 
Bst˚
B 
“ c
2
spst˚ q
1
2c
2
pppt˚ q ° 1 or 2c
2
sps˚t q ° c2ppp˚t q. (24)
(24) shows that the firm increases piece-rate labor more than salaried labor in response to
higher demand volatility unless the di↵erence in the rates of increase in marginal costs of
the two types of labor is very large. In this example, the rate of increase in the marginal
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cost of piece-rate labor has to be less than twice the rate of increase in the marginal cost of
salaried labor by the construction of the stochastic distribution of demand.
Proof. (Proposition 2) To simplify the analysis, I plug in (13) for the ratio on the right-hand
side of (16) and obtain
M ” EpBRt`2{BRt`1qEpBRt`2{Bst`1q “
1´  
 
st`1
Rt`1
° 0. (25)
I plug in (25) when di↵erentiating the equation (16).
Furthermore, I assume convex labor cost functions as follows,
cspstq “ 1
2
ax2 and cppxq “ 1
2
bx2, (26)
where a † b is assumed since temporary labor is less productive or lacks firm-specific skills,
requiring more training.
The derivative of the LHS of (16) with respect to   is
E d
d 
⇡1tpstq “ E⇡2t pstqdstd  . (27)
The derivative of the first term before the brackets on the RHS of (16) with respect to   is
E d
d 
R1t`1pstq “ ER2t`1pstq
ˆ
dst
d 
` dQt
d 
˙
“ ER2t`1pstqdstd  (28)
since EdQtd  “ 0. Let B denote the terms in the brackets on the RHS of (16):
B “ E
ˆB⇡t`1
Bst`1
˙
EpBRt`2{BRt`1q
EpBRt`2{Bst`1q ´ E
B⇡t`1
BRt`1 . (29)
After plugging (25) into (29), I obtain the derivative of B with respect to  :
dB
d 
“ ps1t`1p q `R1t`1p qqr⇡2t`1pst`1qM ´ ⇡2t`1pRt`1qs
` EB⇡t`1Bst`1
ˆ
R1t`1p q
Rt`1
M ` 1´  
 
s1t`1p q
Rt`1
˙
.
(30)
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It follows from (13) that
R1t`1p q “  stRt`1s
1
tp q. (31)
Using the results from (27), (28), (30), (31), total di↵erentiation of (16) is given by
E⇡2t pstqdstd  “  
„
ER2t`1pstq
ˆ
dst
d 
˙
B ` EBRt`1Bst
dB
d 
⇢
(32)
which can be rewritten, using (30), as
s1tp q ” dstd  “
 s1t`1p q
„
ER1t`1pstqK ` 1´   E⇡
1
t`1pst`1q
Rt`1
⇢
E⇡2t pstq ´  
„
ER2t`1pstq `  stRt`1ER1t`1pstqK `  stE⇡1t`1pst`1qM
⇢ (33)
where
K “ E⇡2t`1pst`1qM ´ ⇡2t`1pRt`1q. (34)
I show that the sign of s1tp q depends on Rt. Since the expression is rather unwieldy, I
switch now to more heuristic arguments to determine the sign. First, I assume that s1tp q
and s1t`1p q have the same sign. Second, in the numerator, I know from (17) and (18)
that ER1t`1pstq ° 0 and E⇡1t`1pst`1q † 0, respectively. Moreover, p1 ´  q{ , Rt`1 ° 0. To
determine the sign of K, note that
E⇡2t`1pst`1q “ ´c2spst`1q ´ 12c
2
ppµRt`1 `  
a
Rt`1 ´ st`1q † 0, (35)
and
⇡2t`1pRt`1q “ ´12
„
c2ppµRt`1 `  
a
Rt`1 ´ st`1q
ˆ
µ`  
2
?
Rt`1
˙2
´ c1ppµRt`1 `  
a
Rt`1 ´ st`1q  
4R3{2
⇢
“ ´ b
2
„
µ2 `  
4
?
Rt`1
p3µ´ st`1
Rt`1
q
⇢
† 0.
(36)
Both results following from the convexity of the cost functions assumed in (26) and under
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the reasonable assumption that 3µRt`1 ° st`1. Since M ° 0 from (25), there are conflicting
signs in K; the sign of K depends on Rt`1. The fact that the second derivatives of cost
functions are constants by construction implies that the first term of K in (34) becomes less
negative when Rt`1 gets large, since M ° 0 gets smaller while E⇡2t`1pst`1q † 0 is constant.
However, when Rt`1 gets large, the second term ´⇡2t`1pRt`1q ° 0 of K in (34) increases in
magnitude. Therefore, K becomes positive as Rt`1 increases. Moreover, the second term in
the brackets of the numerator in (33) becomes less negative as Rt`1 increases. Therefore,
the numerator becomes positive when the firm’s reputation is su ciently high.
Now in the denominator, note that
ER2t`1pstq “ 12
 
A
p1´  q
ˆ
ARt`1
st
˙´ 
p´s´2t q † 0,
and as Rt`1 gets large, this quantity gets less negative since it declines in absolute magni-
tude. Furthermore, the sum of the second and last term becomes positive when the firm’s
reputation Rt`1 is su ciently high using the same argument as above. Therefore, the de-
nominator becomes negative when the firm has higher reputation. Taken together, the sign
of s1tp q becomes negative as the firm’s reputation increases.
It is not necessary to separately examine the e↵ect of   on the share of salaried labor in
this case. Recall that the firm hires piece-rate labor in my model only when the high value of
demand is realized. Since that value increases as   increases, and the firms always choose to
serve all demand, a reduction in salaried labor must be matched by a corresponding increase
of piece-rate labor.
To prove the converse—that the firm’s share of salaried labor increases with demand
volatility if the reputation is lower—one can use the same proof as above except hypothesizing
lower values of reputation Rt`1.
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